Gregoris Ioannou (2020) The
normalization of Cyprus’ partition among Greek Cypriots: political economy
and political culture in a divided society, Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan pp. 187-199
The Cyprus dispute’s international dimension has been throughout its history fundamental in shaping its development. As such it is inseparable from its internal dimension, both with respect to the emergence of the dispute as with respect to the failed attempts of its resolution. The so-called external dimension has also been overwhelmingly used by the two communities in Cyprus as an instrument with which to absolve themselves and their responsibility in creating the conflict in the 1950–1975 period and subsequently in keeping it frozen. This does not mean that forces outside Cyprus did not have a significant role in the construction and maintenance of the dispute. Far from it, forces from Greece and Turkey were active from the early stages of the development of the two Cypriot ethnic nationalisms and literally supplied the guns through which the violence was conducted. Britain, the colonial power, instrumentalised and utilised the growing political division between the two communities throughout its rule and as this was intensified in the last stage of its rule it further fomented the unfolding conflict so as to strengthen its own position, both in Cyprus and in the region, shape the transition into the post-colonial era and assume the role of the arbiter in that process.
The Cold War provided more than just the context in which the partition of Cyprus took place. The USA in its effort to maintain the unity of its NATO south-eastern flank, contain the communist threat and prevent the USSR from exploiting the Greco-Turkish antagonism had a very active role in Cyprus in the 1960s and 1970s. This was both directly as well as through its influence on the regimes, the armed forces and the intelligence agencies of Greece, Turkey and the communities in Cyprus. The strength of AKEL since the mid-1940s and the orientation of Makarios towards, and Cyprus’ membership in, the Non-Aligned Movement from the early 1960s onwards was sufficient cause of alarm for the anti-communist USA policy makers and more so their semi-autonomous Intelligence Agencies in an era when the ‘domino theory’ and the ‘containment strategy’ were the dominant frames though which politics was conducted.1 In 1974, the interventions of Greece and Turkey produced the military, political and diplomatic balance that is still in operation today. Yet the Cold War and post-Cold War international dynamics continued to play a determining role in the management of this frozen conflict in the 1980s and 1990s. In the last decades as Cyprus moved towards and subsequently joined the EU, the role of the latter has been gradually enhanced, as it became an additional factor in the resolution formula. More recently, the natural gas issue brought Israel closer to Cyprus making it a quasi-stakeholder in the management of its division.
Although in various instances in this book I pointed to the influence of the bigger regional and international players in the making of the conflict and in the dynamics of its management and non-resolution, I have consistently retained an insider’s standpoint, seeing that is the involvement of external players only in terms of how that impacted developments within Cyprus, less so how they viewed the issue themselves. This was both an analytic and a political decision. Although the big powers may be able to shape the terms of the broader context, societal and political developments are never the result of a chessboard game played by great powerful men at the top. Debunking the stale and poor geopolitical analysis that reigns supreme in the public sphere is a precondition to developing a more nuanced insight as to how politics is played out on the ground.2 This allowed for a more complex and sophisticated analysis contingent on the local class interests and conflicts, internal processes and political dynamics. As a social scientist and an analyst, the argument I articulated in this book is that the key field in which the sad future of Cyprus is being determined is Cyprus and more specifically in the Greek Cypriot community. At the same time as a peace activist I strongly believe that reunification, the precondition to achieve peace in this island can only be a Cypriot matter and a matter for those who live in Cyprus. Hence the subject and the focus of the discussion has been the Cypriot ground and the economic, cultural and ideological forces that shape what I called the normalisation of partition.
In this short postscript I reverse the
analytic lens and examine the Cyprus problem from the outside approaching it
from an international perspective and discussing it in terms of it being a
factor in the region and from the standpoint of the bigger forces, the European
Union and the United Nations. This both complements the preceding analysis and
moves beyond it through a look at the bigger picture. What does the Cyprus de facto
division mean for the Eastern Mediterranean Region and the powers that are
active there? How does the EU deal with this unwanted bequest? What are the
options available to the United Nations after the collapse of the last round of
negotiations in 2017 and the inability to even start a new one since then? The
discussion here will inevitably be somewhat sketchy and even speculative. The
purpose is to outline the current regional and international dynamics in order
to supplement the preceding analysis and illustrate the possibilities lying
ahead for a divided Cyprus as bigger players play their bigger game.
A Regional Nuisance?
In the last decade the key issue that emerged in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean is the offshore hydrocarbons and the question of how these can be exploited by the various countries whose shores allow them to make claims on them. Israel and Egypt were the first states in the region to embark upon the exploration of the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas resources. To do so they delineated their respective Exclusive Economic Zones between themselves and the Republic of Cyprus. This raised questions concerning the potential Exclusive Economic Zone of a future Palestinian state comprising also of the Gaza strip as mentioned in Chap. 7. In addition, there is the unresolved question of the delineation of the Lebanese Exclusive Economic Zone as Lebanon contests the Israeli claims and has thus not completed the delineation of its Exclusive Economic Zone with the Republic of Cyprus. More importantly, however, the Cyprus problem raises a bigger issue as it also directly involves Turkey and Greece in the nexus.
For Turkey the question of the hydrocarbons is part of the broader issue of the geopolitical balance of power in the region. The move made by the Republic of Cyprus, and the attempted tripartite alliances between Greece and Egypt and Greece and Israel via the Republic of Cyprus is seen as an effort to block the territorially biggest and most populous state, which has also the lengthiest coastline, from the exploration and exploitation of the hydrocarbons of the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey is a regional power, competing with Saudi Arabia for hegemony in the Sunni Muslim world and succeeding in that so far as the cases of Qatar, Somalia showed. Turkey’s recent agreement with the Libyan government on the delineation of their EEZ despite Greece’s objections illustrates this.3 At the same time, it is a state that knows not only its power but also the limits of that power as its acceptance of defeat in Syria demonstrated. Thus, beyond merely responding to fears and the moves of the others, in the hydrocarbons’ question and with its drilling and warships south of Cyprus,
it is stating its sphere of influence.
The competition of Turkey and Israel
which was exacerbated in the last decade served as the background for the
structuring of the hydrocarbons question. Although this competition never
extended to the crucial field of economics up to now, at the political and
diplomatic level it continues unabated, and despite some progress in the last
years, it has not really been defused. This has led Israel to seek to enhance
its positioning in the region vis-à-vis Turkey through the hydrocarbons, being
as it is the owner of a small reserve, bringing the Republic of Cyprus under
its sphere of influence and through that, reaching out towards an alliance with
Greece. The narrative of the EastMed, − it is really a narrative rather than a
concrete energy project for a series of technical, economic and political reasons—formalised
through the signing of an interstate agreement by Greece, the Republic of
Cyprus and Israel in January 2020, serves this goal.4
Turkey’s deteriorating relations with
Egypt, the other big state in the region, has also a more explicitly
ideological element as relations became strained after the ousting of the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Justice and Development Party’s sister party, from power.
Despite offensive statements and occasional aggressive rhetoric, as mentioned
earlier, Egypt so far refrained from overtly antagonising Turkey via
delineating an EEZ with Greece. Egypt, the owner of the so far biggest
hydrocarbon reserve in the region, is rather neutral with respect to the Cyprus
issue. Unlike Israel, its energy plans neither depend, nor are complicated by
the existence of the abnormal situation in Cyprus. It is the broader
Greco-Turkish antagonism, which has gained momentum in the last years and which
becomes complicated with its current entanglement with the civil war in neighbouring
Libya that affects Egypt which has to carefully manage to steer through it, rather
than the partition of Cyprus per se. For Israel on the other hand, at least as
far as the strategy it has developed in the last years vis-à-vis the management
of its antagonism with Turkey, keeping the Cyprus conflict unresolved has
become a policy rubric.
Keeping the Cyprus conflict unresolved seems to have gained ground among Greece’s decision-making elite as well. There are two reasons for this: the unwillingness to start a serious and comprehensive negotiation with Turkey over an increasing range of issues and the perceived opportunities in exploiting the deterioration of the relations of Turkey with the West in order to strengthen Greece’s regional position. Despite its economic hardship in the last decade, Greece kept its armed forces intact and is now geared to expand its military capacity to keep up with Turkey’s increased military investments and its recent buying of the S-400 missile system from Russia. The scene for yet another arms race between Greece and Turkey is already set, with the hydrocarbons issue serving as the background. Although both Greece and Turkey would like to avoid military entanglement that carries the risk to degenerate into military confrontation, their relationship is strained and both regimes internally sustain a climate of nationalism that carries the risk of bringing the two countries into open conflict in the absence of meaningful negotiations and mutual compromises. Greece, as the weaker state, fears that this negotiation will need to include the whole range of issues between them. Beyond the EEZ these concern their respective continental shelf, territorial waters, airspace and Flight Information Regions, the sovereignty over certain uninhabited islands and the issue of military presence on others. A subsequent compromise over a number of these issues, sensationalised in public opinion over decades, will become inevitable in the event of an agreement over Cyprus, and this will carry a high political cost for the government of the day. Therefore, maintaining the status quo in Cyprus seems to be a more preferable option at least for one strong faction of the Greek elite to avoid the ‘mess’, especially so since this is the preference of the Greek Cypriot elite.
The USA and Russia as global powers with a stake in the region, and the United Kingdom with also a lingering influence in the region, do not seem to be bothered much by the existing state of affairs in Cyprus. None of the three has any specific interest in the reunification of the island or the maintenance of the de facto partition as they are big and established enough to be able to pursue their geopolitical interests in the region irrespective of what happens on the little Eastern Mediterranean island. The United Kingdom, a state with a direct foothold in Cyprus, has pledged since 2003–2004 and has reiterated this in 2016–2017 that it will cede 50% of the territory of its sovereign bases to the new United Cyprus state if, and when, an agreement is reached. Although the remaining territory could also be claimed by the new state it will probably take a long time before a future United Cyprus could forcefully demand this. In the absence of a United Cyprus, challenging the British Bases is not really a feasible policy. The exit of the United Kingdom from the EU does not affect the status of the British Bases which is sovereign UK territory, part of the Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1959 and re-affirmed upon Cyprus’ entry into the EU in 2004,5 nor the stance of the United Kingdom vis-à-vis Cyprus and its future. The connection of the United Kingdom to Cyprus in the context of the Commonwealth and via trade and tourist links remain significant irrespective of reunification or partition.
Similarly, the USA’s relationship with Cyprus does not depend in its essence on whether it is reunited or remains partitioned. As long it remains broadly speaking within the Western sphere of influence, something that has been sealed with Cyprus’ entry into the EU, what happens in the island has no real impact in terms of the USA grand strategy and policy in the region. Having said that, I should also note that there has been a slight shift in the last years in how the USA acts, not so much in terms of substance but in terms of form. Unlike the early 2000s and the early 2010s, under the Trump administration, the USA seems less interested in facilitating a regional cooperation of its allies in the area—namely Israel, Turkey, Egypt and Greece—and more oriented to manoeuvring through developing antagonisms in the region and utilising them as the backdrop through which to strengthen its own position after losing ground in Iraq and Syria. It is through this frame that the USA policy regarding the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons should be seen and this also explains the lifting of the embargo on the arms sales to Cyprus in 2019. The geopolitical strengthening and increasing autonomy of Turkey and its approach to Russia has strained USA-Turkey relations and led to increasing speculation among Greek Cypriot and Greek elites that this could be exploited— through inducing the USA to take a stance more conducive to their interests. Despite the fact this has proved time and time again to be a naïve reading, it still lingers on and is used to sway public opinion among the Greek Cypriot community, especially the centre-right wing. The occasional gestures made by the USA to sustain this are exchanged with various sorts of facilitations offered by the Republic of Cyprus—from intelligence sharing to implementing US-suggested banking sector policy guidelines and from diplomatic convergence such as the designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation, to providing space for USA rear-guard operations in the Middle East.
Russia acknowledges that Cyprus, united or divided, belongs to the Western sphere of influence. Yet at the same time, due to its historical connection with Russia in the context of its past membership in the Non-Aligned Movement and its geopolitical positioning in the most eastern tip of Europe, Cyprus is seen as a special kind of western country, not readily amenable to anti-Russian stances—and to be sure Russia is interested in maintaining this.6 In the last two decades the significant influx of Russian capital in the Republic of Cyprus’ economy and the increasing tourist volume have nurtured the idea that Russia is a key player in Cyprus. This was given credence by the growth of a Russian community, residing permanently in Limassol integrating but also establishing its own autonomous institutions including schools and media and more recently even a political party. Some went as far as saying or implying that Russia had an interest in keeping the Cyprus problem unresolved and was therefore an obstacle to the reunification of Cyprus.7 This exaggerated, if not utterly false, claim was based on the assumption that Russia was being ousted from the Middle East and that therefore its ‘exit’ from Cyprus would or should be the completion of this process. Nevertheless, the development of the Syrian war and the USA’s continued failures in the Middle East proved that these views were mistaken. Russia maintained its geopolitical weight in the region and that neither depended on nor could be determined by developments in Cyprus. Although not as suddenly as expected or feared, the economic crisis and its handling did after all lead to a reduction of Russian capital in Cyprus in the late 2010s and a more overtly pro-Western stance by Anastasiades government simultaneously with the enhanced Russia-Turkey cooperation. There is no structural change though with respect to Russia’s stance, orientation or indeed influence on conflict dynamics in Cyprus.
An Unwanted European Bequest
As mentioned earlier, the EU effectively
inherited the problem in 2004 after the Greek Cypriot leadership reversed its
stance and negated its 2002–2003 reassurances that it was not to be the party
preventing the resolution of the conflict and allowing a united Cyprus to join
the EU. Although in the years following 2004, the EU slowly but gradually
learned to live with the dispute, it remained committed to its resolution and
made some steps towards this, through the Green Line Regulation, the
maintenance of political contact with the Turkish Cypriot community, the
pressure on the Republic of Cyprus to allow Turkish Cypriot participation in
the European Parliament elections from 2014 onwards and more broadly with
statements urging the two sides to proceed to a compromise agreement and the
provision of political, technocratic and financial support for that purpose. In
the last round of negotiations in 2016–2017 the European Commission assumed
formally an observer status and even
begun preparing for the reunification scenario and how this was to be smoothly accommodated in the existing EU apparatus. The European Commission was a witness of the collapse of the negotiations at Crans Montana in 2017 and of the fact that the main bearer of responsibility was the Greek Cypriot leadership.8 This brought some disappointment expressed in formal statements but really it was neither a shock nor did it lead into substantial policy change, such as for example opening the discussion of direct trade with northern Cyprus. The experience of the Greek Cypriot stance in 2004 made EU officials and technocrats wiser and more detached, while the increasing complication, significance and breadth of the EU-Turkey relations which needed to be managed made European leaders refrain from taking any rushed policy decisions or new measures.
As the current Greek Cypriot leadership had already signalled its willingness to discuss alternative arrangements including a sort of ‘European’ partition of Cyprus, and as this had become public by 2017, the EU was quick to clarify its opposition to this scenario. There are many reasons for this stance and unless there are multiple and substantial reversals in several fields, the EU rejection of a solution of ‘two states in the EU’ is likely to remain for the forceable future. The key reason is that a full EU membership of the TRNC as a state will produce further complications in EU-Turkey relations and reduce the bargaining scale and scope of the EU vis-à-vis Turkey. On the one hand the EU does not want to ‘abandon’ north Cyprus which is European territory, nor the Turkish Cypriots who are European citizens.9 On the other hand, the geopolitical and economic significance of managing effectively its relations with Turkey and finding the means with which the two sides can codify their ‘special relationship’ in which Turkey is outside, yet close to the EU, requires maximum flexibility which could be lost if northern Cyprus enters formally as a separate, independent state.
Allowing the Turkish Cypriots with their
own institutions in, in any form independent from the Greek Cypriots and
Turkey, is seen as a second mistake which will not correct the first one of
2003—that of allowing the Greek Cypriots alone in. In any case even if the
Turkey-EU relationship is codified and stabilised, bringing the TRNC into the
EU, presupposes first formally recognising the partition of Cyprus and then
having the TRNC undergo an accession process which could be blocked along the
way.
Added to these factors, there are other considerations more internal to the European Union: its focus on integration and its reluctance to expand after the experience of the Eurozone crisis and its management and the anxiety not to set up a precedent for autonomist movements within several EU member-states. Additionally, its more general inability to come up with a unitary foreign policy or a stance with which to decisively deal with external challenges it faces and last but not least the legal complications inherent in steering through the terrain of international relations which involves ingenious measures to address complex and politically sensitive issues. Having said that, the inertia which is currently the default position of the EU vis-à-vis the stalemate in the Cyprus dispute and the broader geopolitical antagonism with respect to the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons in which it has been subsumed should not be taken for granted. EU leaders, officials and technocrats have acquired substantial knowledge of the parameters of the Cyprus dispute and the limits with which it can act with ease as well as how to engage with the Turkish Cypriots both via the Republic of Cyprus and independently and directly. In the medium term and in the absence of a subversion of the current path, the necessary political will to ‘lift the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots’ through a series of measures short of formal state recognition can be summoned. On this, Greek Cypriot objections and protests are the least important of the parameters to be considered.
United Nations: Distancing with Caution
The collapse of the negotiations at
Crans Montana in 2017 which provoked what could be seen as a historic statement
by the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres wishing ‘good luck to the Cypriots
north and south’ seemed to signal a process of distancing of the United Nations
from the Cyprus dispute.10 Calling upon the two leaders to enter a period of
reflection and refusing to engage in a renewed diplomatic effort unless both
sides could demonstrate that this time it was to ‘be different’ effectively meant
that the United Nations was taking a step back.11 The possibility of scaling
down the UN peace keeping force (UNFICYP) or even removing it altogether and
leaving only a diplomatic mission stationed in Cyprus was also raised in the
last years and seemed to be acquiring some
force in the early days of Donald Trump in the US administration. The argument made was an economic one—that there was no need to waste valuable UN resources badly needed elsewhere in more serious conflicts. However, it had an implicit political edge in it as well: if this conflict is yet again not resolved as the Cypriots prefer to maintain it rather than compromise to resolve it, and as long it remains a frozen one with no violence, then perhaps it can be allowed to take its course without attracting international attention. Perhaps such a distancing gesture from the United Nations could make the two sides rethink their stance and even increase their willingness to negotiate a comprehensive agreement. A strategic review of the UN peace keeping force was asked by and submitted to the
Security Council in late 2017 and indeed throughout 2018 and 2019 this scenario lurked in the background. In addition to the Secretary-General’s traditional six-month report to the Security Council linked to the extension of UNFICYP’s mandate, an interim report was asked in Resolution 2430 in July 2018 and such interim reports are being additionally submitted since. This effectively links in a more direct way the political developments with the UN peace keeping operations in Cyprus.
However, given the volatility of the
situation with the increasing tensions emanating from the hydrocarbons
competition, the maintenance of the antagonism of the two sides and their
refusal to cooperate even for the slightest technical and everyday issues
regarding the Green Line, the resurgence of nationalism and the readiness with
which it can be exploited
and become the dominant frame in the public opinion in both sides and especially in the Greek Cypriot community, the United Nations does not really have the option of a total withdrawal. Already the Green Line is not easy to monitor—if it ever was—and the prolonged stalemate is conducive to attempts for minor disruptions, due to escalate as UN presence shrinks.12 It is understood that in case of UNFICYP withdrawal, the Republic of Cyprus will not be able to prevent at least its possible partial takeover by the Turkish army, resulting in renewed danger of violence.
At the political level the United Nations remains committed to facilitating an agreement between the sides in Cyprus on the basis of the existing framework of a bicommunal, bizonal federation. Although the experience accumulated by doing this for many decades with no success militates against underestimating the difficulty of this task, it is also widely understood that any other course entails a higher risk. In the last reports of the UN Secretary General increased attention is paid to civil society efforts and various other contextual parameters such as education, gender, citizen movements and citizen exchanges. In an optimist scenario, progress at such societal domains could also induce political developments. In a less optimist one, this could at least thwart the drift into conflict escalation. In any case, as long as people are not killed in Cyprus, the UN can claim that it might not have been able to facilitate the resolution of the conflict, but at least it has prevented it from threatening local and regional peace.
As I argued at several points in this
book though, the status quo in Cyprus is neither static, nor stable nor safe
and the UN knows that perhaps better than everybody, even most Cypriots. Yet,
it has limited power to channel the changes occurring as a result of the
combination of the agency and actions of several actors, internal as well as
external, to a positive direction. The Cyprus problem may be occasionally a
nuisance to the international community, drawing more attention and resources
than warranted by the island’s size and significance, and a factor that bigger
and smaller players need taking account of in their political, geopolitical,
diplomatic and economic calculations. Nevertheless, the Cyprus problem is only
really a problem of and for those who live in Cyprus and only they
can resolve it and build peace on the
island. A peace that is not just the absence of war such as the current
one—based on the ever-temporary balancing of multiple external forces—but a
positive peace, based on a local political decision, a normative, cultural
understanding and a societal movement for progress.
...............................................
1 The domino theory posited that if one
state falls to communism, the near-by ones will
follow and the containment strategy was
the effort to stop this by containing the USSR, its
allies and local communist movements
from increasing their political influence across
the globe.
2 Bozkurt, U. and Trimikliniotis, N.
(2013) Rethinking the Postcolonial Cypriot
Statehood: The Cyprus Problem, Class
Struggles, and Ethnic Conflict. In N. Trimikliniotis
and U. Bozkurt, (eds) Beyond a Divided
Cyprus: a State and Society in Transformation,
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 47–66.
3 Nedos, V. (2020) The coordinates of
the EEZ between Turkey and Libya are published
by the UN [Αναρτώνται οι συντεταγμένες ΑΟΖ, Τουρκίας και Λιβύης από τον ΟΗΕ]
(16/2/2020) Kathimerini
https://www.kathimerini.gr/1065109/article/epikairothta/
politikh/anartwntai-oi-syntetagmenes-aoz-toyrkias-kai-livyhs-apo-ton-ohe
4 The EastMed is technically ambitious
as it involves long distance pipelines in the sea, it is
expensive to construct and in order to
be financially viable would require huge amounts of
natural gas which has not yet been
discovered. Ellinas, C. (2018) EastMed gas pipeline
increasingly doubtful, Cyprus Mail
(2/12/2018) https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/12/02/
eastmed-gas-pipeline-increasingly-doubtful/.
Even if discovered the low price of natural gas
in the global market and the new shift
in EU energy policy away from fossil fuel adds further
doubts to the feasibility of the
EastMed. The revival of the narrative of the EastMed in 2020
had also a significant public relations
element, serving the governments of Greece, Israel and
the Republic of Cyprus to boost their
image and shift attention away from domestic issues.
Ioannou, G. (2020) The narrative of the
EastMed and the attempt to conserve the status
quo in the Cyprus problem [Το αφήγημα EastMed και
η απόπειρα συντήρησης του στάτους
κβο στο Κυπριακό], Babylonia (8/1/2020) https://www.babylonia.gr/2020/01/08/
to-afigima-east-med-kai-i-apopeira-syntirisis-tou-statous-kvo-sto-kypriako/
5 Constantinou, C. and Richmond, O.
(2005) The Long Mile of Empire: Power,
Legitimation and the UK Bases in Cyprus,
Mediterranean Politics, 10(1): 65–84.
6 The generally pro-Russian sentiment
among Greek Cypriots is of two types—in the left
deriving from the USSR’s and later
Russia’s role as a balancing force to Western dominance
and in the centre and right deriving
from conservative Christian Orthodox predispositions.
7 This includes even analysts who, more
or less, report accurately and rightly account for
Anastasiades’ responsibility in the 2017
collapse. See for example Drousiotis, M. (2020)
Anastasiades got his way in
Crans-Montana, Cyprus Mail (9/2/2020) https://cyprus-mail.
com/2020/02/09/anastasiades-got-his-way-in-crans-montana/
8 Although EU officials refrained from
making clear public statements, several informal
comments and leaks to the press point
squarely at this direction. Cyprus Mail’s article which
provides a detailed discussion of what
happened at Crans Montana entitled ‘Anastasiades
blew such a good deal’ on the day
following the collapse, (8/7/2017) [https://cyprus-mail.
com/2017/07/08/anastasiades-blew-good-deal/]
was described in EU representative at
the Summit Kjartan Björnsson’s tweet as
‘a good summary, worth reading’. See also the
analysis by Defteri Anagnosi. Defteri
Anagnosi (2017) Anastasiades misses historical opportunity
[Ο Αναστασιάδης χάνει Ιστορική ευκαιρία] (10/7/2017) http://2ha-cy.blogspot.
com/2017/07/1.html
9 Interestingly the EU is seen by
Turkish Cypriots, especially of the centre and left as an
alternative and friendly outside power,
acting as a balancing force vis-à-vis Turkey, in a similar way that Greek
Cypriots viewed the Non Aligned Movement and indirectly the USSR in the 1960s
vis-à-vis NATO.
10 Hadjicostis, M. (2017) UN chief
Guterres: Talks on Cyprus reunification have
failed, Associated Press (AP) News
(7/7/2017) https://apnews.com/
aa3f3856c56947e8b4e4c8ae5ebaee2b
11 UN News (2019) Guterres holds
‘focused and frank’ informal discussions over future of
Cyprus (25/11/2019) https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/11/1052181
12 A significant increase in military
and construction violations including move-forward
violations along the northern ceasefire
line during 2018 is described in the UN Secretary
General’s Report to the Security
Council. United Nations (2019) United Nations Operation
in Cyprus. Report of the
Secretary-General (10/7/2019) https://undocs.org/
en/S/2019/562
