commentary article presented at the conference on
Political Institutions in the Republic of Cyprus
organised by: Institue of Commonwealth Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
On 1st of March 2013 at the University of Nicosia
The intervention of the Church of Cyprus in politics
Gregoris Ioannou
It
is widely accepted that the Church of Cyprus had managed to
accumulate enormous wealth and influence during the Ottoman times
rendering it the key institution in which economic, ideological and
political power rested by the end of the 19th
Century1.
This often made it a field of contestation within which different
social forces and political tendencies competed with each other with
the key examples being the archiepiscopal elections serials of the
1900s and the late 1940s2.
Although in the rapid modernisation context of the first half of the
20th
Century, there have been significant challenges to its ruling
position, with the Colonial Authorities and a liberal section of the
bourgeoisie on the one hand and the Cypriot Left on the other being
its main competitors in the battle for hegemony, the Church emerged
by the 1950s as the unquestionable winner3.
The
Left in the form of AKEL had watered down completely its critique of
the Church as a reactionary institution, its leaders refrained from
promoting atheism and the party threw its weight within the Church
ranks with its members entering parish committees and campaigning for
the election of the least anti-communist clerics to the Church
hierarchy. The liberals succumbed quickly during the 1950s to the
dominance of the right wing, anti-communist strand of nationalism
which had triumphed by 1949 in the Greek civil war at a time of
global climax of the Cold War and which was sanctioned by the Church
hierarchy. By the end of the 1950s the Colonial Authorities were
negotiating the terms of their exit from Cyprus handing over the
power to the personnel of EOKA and TMT respectively. The fact that
the political leader of EOKA and head of the Church became the first
president of the Republic (remaining in power until his death),
effectively gave the notion of “Ethnarchy” its full political
meaning and materiality.
Makarios
as the intersection of Church and state
Makarios
was not only the product, the expression or the symptom of the
historical trajectory that allowed the traditional institution of the
Church of Cyprus to emerge with a strengthened political role after
the completion of the modernisation process. He was also an active
agent with a role and an important contribution, shaping that is in
various ways and to a significant extent the state which he
bequeathed to his political heirs. There was no real questioning of
the continued and enhanced presence of the Church in the politics of
the country, and even when Makarios' opponents attempted to challenge
his dual role as president and archbishop, it was obvious that this
had all to do with Makarios' policy and nothing with secularism. In
fact Makarios' opponents themselves challenged him decisively within
the Church in the form of the “three bishops' coup” as well,
acknowledging that is the power he drew as a political leader from
his role as a religious leader and effectively reinforcing the
established link between organised religion and politics. At the same
time this worked the opposite way as well. Secular leftists and
democrats in the troubled times of the late 1960s and 1970s found
themselves with no other alternative than to support directly or
indirectly Makarios against the extreme nationalist right whose links
with the military dictatorship in Greece were evident and which
constituted an obvious threat for whatever peace and democracy had
been achieved thus far. On first sight a slogan such as “You
will never win. You will kneel before the Archbishop”
seems an overtly conservative one, yet when placed in its post 1974
coup context, one understands how and why it came to be chanted by
leftists and democrats against armed EOKA B gangs. Summing up that
is, the question of legitimation in the Church – politics nexus has
been two directional. Makarios was able to gather substantial support
as a political leader because he headed the Church, but at the same
time as a political leader he was able to sustain a political role
for the Church, accepted or at least tolerated by secularists.
By
the death of Makarios in 1977, the post colonial political system in
Cyprus had been more or less stabilised. The division of the country
started to be tacitly accepted (and beyond the rhetoric to seem) as
long term, a territorially demarcated federation had been agreed as
the form of the future solution of the Cyprus problem, the housing
and the reconstruction process was speeded up, class peace for the
benefit of the homeland firmly established, civil war averted,
Makarios' heirs held state power and the coupists were forgiven as
far as the state was concerned and housed in a broader right wing
party DISI, founded and headed by the liberal pro western politician,
Clerides. Makarios' supporters comprised the other two main political
parties, DIKO as his party par excellence and EDEK as the party of
his trusted man Lyssaridis, the so called patriotic forces allied
until the early 1990s with AKEL. Chrysostomos I, who took over as the
new archbishop (with some exceptions such as the campaign for the set
up of an extra special defence fund) generally refrained from direct,
continuous or frequent intervention in politics, leaving Makarios'
political heirs to do their job, provided of course that he kept his
say over education and Cyprus problem matters and to the extent that
he more or less agreed with the orientations of their politics.
A
sort of symbiotic relationship was developed between the politicians
and the Church leaders respecting each others' institutional autonomy
yet cooperating closely and being complementary aspects of the
communal organisation and ideological imaginary. The Church was no
longer going to be a field within which politics would be played out
but was not going to be restricted to a merely ceremonial role and as
an ancient institution of accumulated wisdom, it would supervise the
coordinates of the political system. The state was no longer going to
be led by priests but it would not become in reality fully secular
despite pronouncements to the contrary. And more importantly a sort
of tacit agreement between the personnel of the state and the
personnel of the Church would delay as much as possible the process
of secularisation at the level of society as well. This was more or
less the story of the 1980s in Cyprus.
The
Church-politics nexus in a new era
By
the early 1990s however, this sort of arrangement seemed no longer
sustainable. There were developments on a series of fields that
brought about shifts in the positions and stances of state and church
actors responding to the changing context of a society undergoing
substantial transformation. The rapid economic growth led by the
tourist boom and the increased integration of Cyprus in the global
economy enhanced the influence and role of business in general and
the Church as a business actor in particular. The liberal breeze
brought about by the Vasileiou government in a more generalised
attempt to “modernise the state” and the orientation towards the
European Community allowed some progressive reforms to happen and be
accepted, with family law changes (eg the institutionalisation of
civil marriage and divorce) and later on the decriminalisation of
homosexuality being the most characteristic of this era. There was
also some sort of an attempt by the Church of Cyprus to modernise
itself to some extent, increase its tolerance with respect to lax
moral behaviours, lifestyles and new habits of the faithful in order
to adapt to the new times while maintaining its influence.
Nevertheless one should not overestimate the change. The Church's
ideological influence remained strong, its conservatism as an
institution maintained and its hegemony in educational and morality
matters reaffirmed in the course of the decade. The fact that
Clerides himself, the liberal president already in his late 70s felt
compelled to have his Indian wife baptised so that he could have a
Christian Orthodox wedding with her, was deeply symbolic of the
continued dominance of the Church amidst and despite the changing
climate.
What
was more obvious though in the 1990s was the more direct intervention
of the Church in the politics of the Cyprus problem. The breaking of
the deadlock in the negotiations brought about by Vasileiou's
activist Cyprus problem policy which made the possibility of a
federal solution a visible prospect in the form of the “Ghali set
of Ideas” provoked an alert amongst rejectionists in general and
the Church in particular. The archbishop himself encouraged a series
of acts aiming to enlighten the people and warn the political leaders
that they ought to return to the “correct line” refusing that is
negotiations with a view towards achieving a compromise solution and
intensifying the campaigning against Turkey. In the presidential
elections of 1993 the Archbishop encouraged the alliance between DIKO
and EDEK on a rejectionist, quasi anti-federal platform and pressured
with significant success Clerides to adopt a harder line on the
Cyprus problem in order to get elected.
The
1990s was a time of a more general rekindling of the anti-compromise
forces in the guise of the “anti-occupation movement” and these
were supported in numerous ways and to a significant extent by the
Church and the Archbishop himself personally. Associations of the
faithful, youth religious networks and conservative community groups
were re-organised and given more attention, displaced persons clubs
were revived with the slogan of “Return” denoting literally “a
return to their villages” in the north but also and more
importantly connoting “the return to the pre 1974 condition”. The
Pancyprian Refugee Party was formed which focused its energy in
combating all rapprochement activities between the Greek Cypriots
(referred to as the victims) and the perpetrator forces of Attila
(which also included all the Turkish Cypriots residing in the north).
The leader of this Party, who was also the archbishop's nephew,
gathered some of the women who had lost their loved ones in the war
of 1974 and set up a permanent protest stand at Ledra Pallace, in
order to enlighten the tourists crossing the buffer zone about the
crimes of Turkey and prevent them from supporting the illegal and
pseudo regime in the north by entering the area under its control.
This was the time that the Church also formed its own radio station
and then television so that the word of God and his archbishop in
Cyprus could reach every house. On a more directly political level
and originally seemingly independent from the Church, there was also
the creation of the first officially anti federation party, the New
Horizons.
The
resurgence of the rejectionist forces in the mid 1990s took place in
a more generalised nationalist climate that took root with the return
of the united Right to executive power. Although more symbolic than
substantial and to be sure largely banal, nationalism in the 1990s
had concrete impact in the broader climate within which Cyprus
politics were played out. Pronouncements such as the need for a
“Hellenocentric education” and the appointment of the relevant
ministers, the repetitive public glorification of EOKA and the set up
of institutional means to implement this, the further expansion of
armaments spending and the United Defence Doctrine in the
over-arching strategy of the “active volcano” were largely
aspects of a spectacle yet with a real negative impact. The
motorcyclists “march from Berlin to Kyrenia” which had Church and
government backing until the last minute and its tragic end was the
most emblematic event in this sense.
Church
and politics today
The
crucial period of 2003-2004 found the Church of Cyprus headless as
the archbishop was old and sick and the bishops were in competition
with each other with a view to succession. The different ideological
tendencies and orientations expressed by different bishops and their
alliances and competitions might be an interesting topic for
discussion if those who study it open it up, but for the purposes of
this argument, intra Church politics are not directly relevant. The
Paphos bishop who was the eldest and acting head at the time was
quite clear – and his position was shared or tolerated by all the
rest of the high priests with the exception of one. And this stance
of the Church, adapting to the new circumstances of the new decade
continues more or less until today. This can be summed up as an
opposition to any sort of compromise solution that creates a secular,
bi-communal state that diminishes directly or indirectly the
political influence, ideological hegemony and economic power of the
Church as this has been established in the conditions of de facto
partition. And most importantly pre-emptive action and campaigning
with all means possible in order to avert this from happening. Mass
church attendance in times such as Christmas and Easter and full
coverage by the media of all the statements made by Church leaders
proved useful instruments in the spreading of anti-solution
propaganda. One need not focus on the more extreme statements such as
those of the ex Bishop of Kyrenia who said that those who were to
vote Yes in the referendum were bound to go to hell, but on myriad
others who were in line with the nationalist rhetoric often with
racist connotations of many politicians of the “hard No camp” in
2004 and after.
The
current archbishop, Chrysostomos II has of course many continuities
with the previous one – but is at the same time different in style
and public behaviour. Although there is probably an element of
personal character here, it might also be that his lack of pretenses,
his audacity and his cynicism are products of our era. A dear
colleague insists that he is really an ally of the forces of
secularism, not only because of his secular oriented outlook, worldly
discourse and brute business mentality, but also and primarily
because he is making the best he can to remove the last remaining
veils of religiosity and aura from the institution he is heading.
That he is in fact the key agent of the demythologisation of the
Church and of the erosion of the traditional respect it carries. This
might be an interesting thought, yet again one might respond with
equal cynicism back – the social power of the Church lies not so
much in the metaphysics of its legitimation but rather simply and
plainly in its ability to command and have the others obey.
In
this sense the conflict between the Church and Christofias'
government was quite illuminating in many ways. The fact that the
government had eventually to back down on the issue of taxing the
Church and effectively accept the agreement made between the Church
and Papadopoulos' government which was blatantly benefiting the
Church and was thus initially rejected by Christofias' government,
was illustrative not only of the weakness of the government but also
and more importantly of the weakness of the state itself vis a vis
the Church. The Archbishop actually made a statement that he would
not pay even if the government secured a court decision and this
passed more or less as a normal or natural thing. Similarly on the
issue of educational reform, his statements that if the history
books change he would call upon the students to burn the new ones,
become important not only in terms of the final outcome – the non
changing of the nationalist focus and ethnocentric philosophy of
education in general and history teaching in particular, but again
because this sort of statements passed in the best case as merely
excusable exaggerations and in the worse as rightful and justified
worries of a caring spiritual leader.
On
the Cyprus problem negotiations, before their final deadlock,
Chrysostomos II also moved preemptively openly stating his support
for new far right wing groupings which emerged, for the
anti-federation forces which became more open and loud in their
anti-solution cries and placing paid coloured anti-solution
advertisements in every Sunday edition of the newspaper with the
biggest circulation for months. The list of the current archbishop's
interventions in politics in the last few years is of course long and
cannot be exhausted here – I will only mention two more which are
quite characteristic:
a)
his role in the election of Omerou as the head of parliament and the
statement he made while justifying his encouraging of Koulias to
switch camps, that he was one of the three founders of DIKO, implying
that this gave him some sort of special right and say in DIKO's
affairs.
b)
the open support he offered to Anastasiades and the reciprocation of
the new president who offered him the ministry of education, just
like the good old times.
So,
what does all this tell us? Explanations along the lines of our
“conservative society” and of our “troubled history” are of
course important and can account for a lot of things. But I am not
sure that they fully make the point. We live in a society in which
religious instruction to all the children is compulsory, where
although the economic crisis has brought the construction sector to
its knees, the building of churches continues, where even atheists
bow to the paramount social pressure and have religious weddings and
baptise their children. We live in a society in which the ethnic
conflict of the past not only shapes the present but blocks the
future, where nationalist myth constitutes official history, where on
television during Easter the first news item is that “Today Jesus
Christ was resurrected”. One might respond that these are simply
the effects and not the causes of the huge social and ideological
hegemony of the Church. And that its causes need to be sought in its
political and economic power. True, but the effects of the Church's
political and economic power today are also the causes of its
hegemony tomorrow.
1Michael,
M. (2005) The Church of Cyprus during the Ottoman period, Cyprus
Research Centre
2Panayiotou,
A (2006) Models of compromise and power sharing in the experience of
Cypriot modernity, The Cyprus Review 18:2
3Erdal,
M. (2011) The making of sovereignty through changing property/land
rights and the contestation of authority in Cyprus, unpublished PhD
dissertation, Oxford
