Civil disobedience contesting Cyprus’ partition: citizens acting against crossing points closure

Gregoris Ioannou

published in The Sociological Review, 30/6/2020 https://www.thesociologicalreview.com/civil-disobedience-contesting-cyprus-partition-citizens-acting-against-crossing-points-closure/?fbclid=IwAR3I4m33CC85TB5_qJCmeRqm4YjlnvPMguthJJpqTTOOBWOJo1O36FNHpwU

Photo: Gregoris Ioannou

As of mid-March 2020, crossing the dividing line between the northern and the southern part of Cyprus has been forbidden. Although the closure was termed temporary and only made possible through the appeal to, and exploitation of, the public health crisis provoked by global pandemic Covid-19, the process through which this was done revealed yet once more the social dynamics of partition politics. This article discusses citizen action contesting the closure of the crossing points in late February and early March, before the general lock-down measures were imposed by the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot administration in the northern part of the island. 

The aim, like my ontological perspective and involvement in this, is dual. On the one hand, to provide an outline of the context and an analysis of the implications of the act of civil disobedience and on the other, to intervene in the on-going public debate in Cyprus about the separation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to which the currently closed crossing points are subsumed. Being at the same time a peace activist and a sociologist, a participant, and a researcher in the social mobilisation, allows me to have direct access to empirical information as well as theoretical tools with which to interpret the event and assess its significance. This also poses a challenge as multiple balances must be kept – between the objective facts and the subjective and inter-subjective meanings, the political and the analytic levels, the reporting, and the explanatory functions. Yet, being able to comprehend the connection between the biographical narrative and the macro-historical plane and situate the former within the latter is a key parameter of what C. Wright Mills defined more than half a century ago as the sociological imagination. This insight can illuminate the nexus of peace activism and public sociology of which this article is an embedded example.

Photo: Gregoris Ioannou

Division, crossings and closure

The inter-ethnic conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots marked the transition of Cyprus from a British colony to independent statehood and the two main communities’ failure to collaborate in power-sharing in the bi-communal framework of the Republic of Cyprus established in 1959 resulted in violence in the early 1960s and their total separation, completed in 1974 after Greek coup d’etat and the Turkish invasion. Until 2003 when the first checkpoints opened allowing movement across the cease-fire line, contact between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was effectively prohibited. The peace and reunification movement that emerged since the late 1980s, practicing rapproachment through bi-communal meetings abroad, at the Ledra Pallace hotel serving as the UN headquarters in the buffer zone, and in the mixed village Pyla situated at the intersection of territory controlled by the Republic, the Turkish army and one of the two British Military Bases, remained relatively small and too weak to influence politics.

It was only in the 2000s that substantial progress was made in the negotiations and with the imminent entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU and after mass protests by the Turkish Cypriots against their nationalist leadership it became possible to have the checkpoints opened in 2003. Although the reunification of the island was not achieved, after the majority of Greek Cypriots rejected the UN Plan in 2004 in a referendum, and although subsequent round of negotiations failed the open crossings for 17 years allowed the retreat of prejudice and suspicion and the improvement of the climate and relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. More importantly the open crossings allowed some space, literally and politically, to the peace movement in both communities to pursue the goal of Cyprus reunification.

President Anastasiades’ move to unilaterally close four of the seven checkpoints under his government’s control (the remaining two of the nine open are under the control by the British Sovereign Bases on their southern part) in late February using Covid-19 as an excuse came as a surprise to everybody for many reasons. It was illegal since it contravened the Green Line Regulation with the EU only informed post-facto, and it was irrational because no other measures were taken at the time in relation to Covid-19 – there were no restrictions and not even any checks in the airports to flights arriving from countries with a high number of infections. Politically it was provocative as it was implemented without consulting the UN or the Turkish Cypriot side, it ignored the Bi-communal Technical Committee on Health and effectively alluded that the threat to public health came from the Turkish Cypriot community in the north.

When challenged by the peace and reunification movement, the Turkish Cypriot leadership but also the UN itself, Anastasiades’ government framed it as a sovereignty issue effectively confirming that the move was really about the politics of Cyprus division. A few weeks later, after Covid-19 did arrive in Cyprus, ironically on the same day south and north separately from UK and German travellers respectively, the sovereignty game, diachronically structuring the “Cyprus problem” and central in the maintenance of Cyprus division was played out even more sadly with respect to the reporting of incidences and deaths. The Republic of Cyprus restricted its reporting only to those occurring in the south, as if the northern territory was a separate country. And with one exception concerning the sharing of medical supplies coming from China, there was no cooperation between the two sides in dealing with Covid-19 whatsoever.

Photo: Gregoris Ioannou

Pushing the barricades

On a practical level the closure of the four crossings neutralized some of the remaining ones which were used in conjunction with the closed ones while it increased the traffic on others. The closure of the Ledra street checkpoint, the busy pedestrian crossing point in the heart of old Nicosia, however, was of immense symbolic significance and the biggest blow to the peace and reunification movement. Ledra street was opened in 2008 after coordinated and simultaneous pressure from peace activists north and south and has since become the reference point for the reunification movement. Ledra street checkpoint became thus naturally the main site where the contestation of the closure was played out in 2020. When Anastasiades government announced the closure on 28th February spontaneous reactions begun which coalesced into a demonstration the following day, Saturday, when several hundred activists pushed down the barricade erected by the police and stormed into the buffer zone. There, Greek Cypriots met dozens of Turkish Cypriots who joined them from the north and effectively the checkpoint was re-opened for a few hours. This unprecedented act of civil disobedience illustrated both the significance of crossings for many Cypriots as well as their readiness to act to keep the checkpoints open.

Following the citizens’ action of 29th February Anastasiades’ government used the nationalist media, the far right and the police to defame, vilify and frighten the peace movement and prevent a repeat of citizens forcing open the checkpoint again. The media isolated a ten second scuffle of a protester pushing a soldier, in any case illegally present in the demilitarized buffer zone and doing police work, using it to frame the protesters as violent. Beyond the attempt to delegitimize the peace movement, the promotion of a “law and order” frame aimed at bullying the peace activists. The police harassed individuals threatening to charge them for “illegal assembly” and “rioting” and the far-right staged protests in the next days, demanding the closure of all checkpoints. The peace movement was not cowed however and despite several reservations the core peace activists were able to gather a bigger crowd on the following Saturday 7th March. An also bigger crowd of Turkish Cypriots entered the buffer zone and pushed from the north making the Republic of Cyprus’ police lose its temper and use spray against them.

Returning to the bigger picture

Beyond allying with the Greek Cypriot far-right wing and quasi-fascist ELAM, which boasted that closing the checkpoints was its own suggestion, by unilaterally closing the four crossing points Anastasiades also intervened in Turkish Cypriot politics. In addition to frustrating the Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akıncı’s efforts to promote collaboration in the context of the Bicommunal Technical Committee for Health, the creation of a climate of tension in bi-communal relations was expected to benefit the nationalist Ersin Tatar who heads the government in the north and who is contesting Akıncı for the community’s leadership in the upcoming presidential elections. In fact, Tatar did pick up the Greek Cypriot challenge and responded by unilaterally closing three different additional crossings and finally all of them.

The populist exploitation of Covid-19 for nationalist purposes initially by Anastasiades’ government and subsequently also by Tatar’s government in the north, and their game of competition about the image of sovereignty which has continued also in the context of the current gradual re-opening, is bound to have deeper repercussions in the future. The three-month closure brought about again the absolute separation of the two communities reminiscent of the pre-2003 situation. More importantly it contributed further to the imaginary of Cyprus’ partition as the ‘normal’, as the default position in the current critical times whereby the two parts of the island operate as if they are different countries antagonising even with respect to public health. However, the civil disobedience of the peace activists against the closure has also left its historical imprint.   

It will be difficult to keep the checkpoints closed for too long. The pressure from the EU and the UN, is expected to grow as the UN Secretary Generally is due to submit his Report to the Security Council in July. Already the frequent protests from Turkish Cypriots who work in the south and the dissatisfaction of a significant segment of the public in both communities has forced some developments. In late May the two sides, after having already relaxed most of the restrictions imposed in March, had their first exchange of epidemiological data but in June the two sides entered a new competition about when and how and for whom some of the checkpoints were to re-open resulting in two unilateral moves again opening up some crossings but not the two main pedestrian ones in Nicosia. However, the making of a privately conducted and paid Covid-19 test a prerequisite for crossing (only once for the north but every three days for the south) in practice restricts crossing even via the few checkpoints that have reopened. Even if all nine crossings re-open again without restrictions in the coming months, the closure and semi-closure regimes have set precedents. If the authorities did it once, they can do it again, if there is say a second wave of Covid-19 or something else that can be termed as “emergency” in the future. At the end of the day it remains up to the citizens themselves to ensure that their contestation of closed checkpoints, ethnic separation and the division of their country is a factor to be reckoned with.  

Gregoris Ioannou is a political sociologist and a Research Fellow at the University of Glasgow. His research focuses on labour relations, class conflicts, social movements and contentious politics, and the South European crisis. His recent publications have dealt with trade unions, populism and left radicalism, the division of Cyprus and the labour market in the crisis. His book “The normalization of Cyprus’ partition among Greek Cypriots: political economy and political culture in a divided society” is forthcoming in September by Palgrave Macmillan while earlier versions were published in Greek (2019) and Turkish (2020).

Old conflict still asleep

Gregoris Ioannou, interview by Maria Skora for “Political Critique: magazine of politics and culture”

http://krytykapolityczna.pl/swiat/ue/cypr-rozmowa/

“Well, I hope war doesn’t happen”

The Cyprus dispute: a latent conflict within the EU

Cyprus, an island visited by approximately two millions of tourist a year. Enjoying  its Mediterranean climate, little does one realize how tragic its history is, marked with occupation and violence: first under Ottoman rule, then as a British Crown Colony, and finally when in a domestic conflict neighbours turned agains each other. This dramatic past is still reflected in the present. It’s fair to say that the ongoing division between the Republic of Cyprus and The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a quasi-state without international recognition, is a conflict actually going on within the European Union, of which many forgot or even are unaware of. In a broader perspective, the Cyprus dispute shows at glance how an intersection of big geopolitics, nationalism, and persisting physical division can scar a society.

Before we start talking about the future, let’s briefly look back. How exactly did it happen that today Cyprus remains a divided country and formally remains in the state of conflict?

The division of Cyprus has its roots in the late colonial period. It was a British Crown colony till 1960, and it was in the context of the anti-colonial movement the Greek Cypriot community came into clash with the Turkish Cypriots. It was a gradual process through the first half of the 20^th Century whereby the two communities in Cyprus were ethnized initially based on religion and adopted separate national identities. They started to perceive themselves as exclusive of each other - the Christian-Orthodox population, which also was the majority, imagined itself as part of the Greek nation and so were the Muslim Cypriots, imagining themselves as Turks, part of the Turkish nation. In the 1950s it culminated when the Greek Cypriot leadership attempted to unite with Greece, what the Turkish Cypriots opposed and responded with the demand that the island should be divided. In 1958, when the British decided to leave and started negotiating transition, violence escalated and spread from the paramilitaries to the population as well. Eventually, due to an agreement met by Greece and Turkey, an independent state was launched, a sort of consociational republic, with bi-communal representation for all positions of power, a Greek Cypriot president and Turkish Cypriot vice president, for example. The British retained two sovereign military bases and left leaving a bi-communal system based on political equality that needed consent to operate. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that neither of the leaderships of both communities believed in a bi-communal united Cyprus and instead saw the Republic of Cyprus as a stepping stone towards their national aims - Enosis, a complete union with Greece or Taksim, a permanent partition of the island, for the Turkish Cypriots. There was mistrust, unwillingness to abide by the constitution, violence erupted again, and by 1963 the bi-communal state collapsed, Greek Cypriots took control of the state and Turkish Cypriots withdrew in enclaves.

To what extent geopolitical factors contributed to this status quo?

It’s important to keep in mind that even though the conflict was fueled by nationalisms of the two communities, Cyprus was a high stake in a bigger geopolitical game. We need to see the domestic issue with a relation to a broader competition between Greece and Turkey for influence in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey opposed the possibility of Cyprus being annexed by Greece for many reasons, security being one of them. Cyprus was considered to be, more or less, in the western sphere of NATO influence. In 1959, when the independent Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed, it did not become a NATO member. The international agreement forming the balance of power at the moment of establishing independent Cyprus was guaranteed by three NATO members: Greece, Turkey and Britain, not NATO itself. So there was a relative balance between Turkey and Greece, but it was disrupted in 1963. Then, only in 1974, a new equilibrium was restored.

And how much the Cold War, if at all, influenced this process?

The Cold War has marked the Cyprus problem, too. Once the violence started in the mid-1960s and the state collapsed, the United States revised its position. Rather than supporting an independent, bi-communal republic as it was in the basic agreement, they reckoned it would be better to have the island co-ruled by Greece and Turkey, both NATO members. This was what framed the decade between 1964 and 1974, when the Republic was effectively left in the Greek Cypriot hands, under the leadership of president Makarios, also an archbishop. Makarios, to avoid the American preference for increased role of Greece and Turkey in Cyprus, opted for the Non-Aligned Movement and closer relations with the Eastern Block. He was of course not left wing as he was a bishop, but he developed this policy to prevent dividing the country between Greece and Turkey. In 1974, when the Greek junta was trying to dictate policies to Makarios and overthrow him, five days after the coup d’etat, the Turkish army invaded the island and sealed its partition.

So what is Cyprus today? Do nationalisms of those patron countries still persist or a genuine Cypriot identity has developed meanwhile?

1974 was a big thing as it completed the process of partition. It was also significant regarding the ideologies and the building of identity. The Greek Cypriots felt betrayed by Greece in 1974 and Enosis, the idea of unification with Greece, was seen as something that could only bring disaster. Claiming the union with Greece was fully discredited, and Greek Cypriot nationalism shifted from the idea of Enosis to the idea of an independent Greek Cypriot state, marginalising the Turkish Cypriot community and treating it as a political minority. This was a gradual process under way since the late 1950s, prominent in the period 1964-1974, and entrenched thereafter.

And the Turkish counterpart?

Among Turkish Cypriots, there was a similar trend taking even one step further in the recent years. Turkish Cypriots initially welcomed the Turkish intervention because as a smaller community they felt threatened by the bigger Greek community. However gradually, over the years as the conflict froze, the Turkish Cypriots found themselves isolated because as a non-recognized state they don’t have any proper diplomatic relations. So when the Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus applied for the EU-membership, the Turkish Cypriots saw it as an opportunity to finally overcome isolation through unification based on a federal bi-communal model. The beginning of 21st century, years 2000-2004, were the time of mass mobilisation against the traditional nationalist leadership and its project of divided Cyprus. Majority supported the unification. But when negotiations proceeded and eventually a peace plan was proposed by the UN, the Greek Cypriots rejected the deal in a referendum.

Why?!

I could think of four main reasons. One is the idea that Cyprus is essentially Greek and this peace plan was not accommodating that view, allowing for political equality and power-sharing with Turkish Cypriots. The second would be the fear of Turkey itself, and its possible influence on Cyprus. Then, there are conjunctional reasons: economics and the EU. When it comes to the economy, southern Cyprus was booming and hence the fear of having to pay the costs of unification. The EU factor is more interesting as the EU membership was seen in mythical terms – that the Greek Cypriots would increase their leverage in the negotiations and expel Turkey from the island, together with the 1960 constitution.

But then is Greek and/or Turkish influence still tangible in Cyprus? Are Greece and Turkey still trying to intervene in this conflict?

This is a good question. After 1974 the influence of Greece declined, however, it has not evaporated. Cyprus is not a protectorate, but it is neither fully independent. For example, the Greek state appoints the head of the army of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek flag is everywhere, education systems are very connected. The foreign policy of the Republic of Cyprus is nominally independent but never complete without the policy of Greece. So there is a connection. The ongoing division legitimises the belief that having Turkey so close cannot be dealt away without the backing of Greece. In the post-1974 reality, Turkey influences the north directly, and Greece has some indirect influence in the south.

But as a non-recognized state, northern Cyprus must be far more dependent on Turkey than the Republic on Greece?

Regarding northern Cyprus, in Turkish imaginary, there was this idea of it as a place of the Turkish army who fought the war for this land and therefore had political control over the Turkish Cypriot leadership. However, with Erdogan, it has changed. First of all, he is interested in the reunification of Cyprus. He does not see Cyprus as a national issue like the military Kemalists did. Erdogan sees Cyprus in diplomatic terms, as part of his relations with the west. Once he came to power, the reunification of Cyprus became really possible. Erdogan is of course not the same today as Erdogan back then - he was more moderate before taking on the authoritarian route. However, his policy on Cyprus has not changed. He does not seem interested in maintaining the status quo. He sees the situation as creating unnecessary problems for Turkey. Nevertheless, with Erdogan the direct influence of Turkey in northern Cyprus has expanded, not in the old way of Kemalist style: population, settlers, army. Now Turkish capital is flowing massively into northern Cyprus, infrastructure is being built, workers are arriving. Northern Cyprus has actually transformed more in the last decade than ever before. Furthermore, Islamic networks try to intervene in the cultural dimension. Remember that Turkish Cypriots are the most secular Muslims in the world.

So it’s been nearly 45 years of ongoing conflict: physical existence of the division and constant presence of the military. I imagine the past traumas must have an impact on society. How does the division of Cyprus influence Greek- Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities? How has the division affected the attitudes among both societies in the long term?

I think the conflict has had a significant impact on society. The traumas inflicted in the decade between 1964 and 1974 as well as the actual invasion of 1974 have not been healed. They are cultivated and reproduced by the power structures in both communities. It is essential to understand that even though since 1974 the conflict is frozen, it sustains modes of thinking. You need to see that in relation with the education system: because of the conflict the education system is overtly nationalist, trying to prepare children to be able to fight for their country and as male citizens to go serve in the army (which is obligatory in both sides). And it is not only two years that you serve in the military, then you go to the reserve and every couple of months you go to one-day training. Be ready for war when it comes! On the social level, the existence of the conflict also results in suppressing a series of other issues and dominating the political scene. Other issues that could be important are being brushed aside: we don’t have time for LGBTQ rights, because we have a war going on. We don’t have time for class conflict because we have an enemy at our door and need to be united. It is restricting the society and confining political debates.

It is interesting you mention drafting only male citizens and the constant alert to defend the fatherland. Here, in these patriarchal structures, one could see parallels with Eastern Europe which also has a history of fights for independence, what definitely influenced the gender contract and understanding of male and female roles as citizens. Am I right?

Yes, the Cypriot society is quite patriarchal. Also, during the conflict sexual violence was used as a weapon of war by paramilitary on both sides and these are again not processed traumas. Today, women don’t have to serve in the army, no Israeli concept is in place here, but they have to attend the civil defence. It’s based on the idea that men fight and women support them.

Ok, but what are the positions of the main political actors in northern Cyprus and in the Republic of Cyprus then? What is the position of the Greek-Cypriot left? Is cooperation with the Turkish-Cypriot left possible?

The Greek Cypriot left was the only political force in the Greek Cypriot community that maintained contact with the Turkish Cypriot community and was more oriented towards peace rapprochement. There is a connection because of the internationalist ideology as well as the idea of prioritising “Cypriotness”, whereas the Greek Cypriot right-wing was more nationalist, more Greek-centered and less willing to engage with other Cypriots and compromise with them. However, there are peculiarities in the Greek Cypriot political scene. The major right-wing party, member of the EPP and in government now, has a liberal and a right-wing faction, which is much more dominant. The liberal-oriented politicians have proven to be too week to influence the policy, and in the last round of the negotiations, although progress was made, we still didn’t come to the agreement, because there was not enough political will in the ruling party to push towards an agreement with Turkish Cypriot leadership.

And what about the Turkish Cypriot politics?

Two left-wing parties have been supporting the compromise. In northern Cyprus, there is a different political system, a parliamentary one, whereas in the Greek Cyprus it’s presidential. In the parliament in the north a coalition of left-wing and liberal parties was formed but the president, who is solely responsible for negotiations, is a traditional Cypriot peace-oriented leader. There were big hopes when he came to power and hence the collapse of the talks in Switzerland in 2017 was a big disappointment.

So what are the possible scenarios for Cyprus?

I don’t see too many scenarios, only two are possible basically. One is launching a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation, what has been negotiated for so many decades now. In my view, this would be an ideal scenario because it would allow the conflict to end. I don’t see that scenario happening in the next years, though. The left is the only actor fully committed to reunification through federation. On both sides, that has not changed. What has changed is the power of the left. The left in both the north and the south is weakened, it’s a global trend. The left could start the unification - but it’s not strong enough to enforce it. In theory, of course, all parties want to see Cyprus united - but then it comes to the compromises that would have to be made, it’s only the left that is sincere.

What are other hurdles on the way to unification? Are there obstructions on the way still resulting from geopolitical factors?

There are many hurdles. One is that a substantial part of the population on both sides, but probably more prominent in the Greek Cypriot community, is opposed to any model of power sharing. There also is the issue of geopolitical tensions and resources: access to natural gas made this competition even fiercer. The attempts of Israel to form a new alliance with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus won’t be conducive for reaching a peace agreement either. So if there is no peace agreement the only option is the status quo, continuing the situation as it is, although not viable. But there is another scenario, even more far-fetched: an agreement that the two sides cannot live together anymore and therefore they should divide Cyprus permanently. Negotiations on this issue are really considered today. So far, issues of property, territory, exclusive economic zones are not seen as important because it's assumed that after all there will be a united federal state someday. But it makes a huge difference when you negotiate borders of two sovereign states. And then, on top of that, the question of natural gas emerges. In the unifying scenario, the gas belongs to the whole island, but with two states there are two different economic zones. And this has to be negotiated. Last but not least, there is a question of political legitimacy - who has the right to actually sign the agreement on behalf of Cyprus? Negotiating partition, even if in recent years it has been more heard of in the public sphere, will never gather a majority, I think.

Isn’t permanent secession also not favourable because of the European Union? Sort of an adverse situation with Brexit dispute between the UK and Scotland and the necessity of renewing the membership when launching a new state entity.

Exactly. Cyprus was accepted in the EU as a whole. The Greek Cypriots are temporarily governing the Republic pending the solution to Cyprus problem. This is the official legal situation. Potential partition would be a mess: legal, political, might even bring violence. So I don’t think it will be pushed through. Maybe in 10, 20 years things will be different, but now I don’t see this scenario of partition happening.

So if living together is so difficult but breaking up is not an option - what will happen?

Well, I hope war doesn’t happen. Continuing this frozen conflict is the most likely scenario, with different developments happening, decided by Turkey effectively. There is, for example, Varosha, a “ghost town” as no one was allowed to settle in there after 1974. The Turkish military keeps it as a sort of bargaining tool. Now there are rumours that Turkey might actually open it up for Greek Cypriots to come and live as residents in northern Cyprus. Things can happen on the ground, like there could be direct trade with north Cyprus. So far, the Greek Cypriot side blocks it claiming it is an illegal territory. There are even no direct flights to northern Cyprus. Living in a non-recognized state means that one has contact with the outside world only through Turkey. And there have been rumours in the last year that at some point Turkey might decide to annex the north of the island, like Russia annexed Crimea. That’s still a possibility, a far-fetched scenario but it has been already publicly discussed.

So what would you wish for the people of Cyprus in 2019?

I wish that the inter-communal contacts increase as I believe it’s the only thing that can save Cyprus in the future. Whatever happens at the level of leadership and politics, if social contacts between people continue to exist and strong relationships are built across the border it can be a step towards peace.

Gregoris Ioannou is a political sociologist and an Associate Researcher at the University of Glasgow. He has co-edited a book volume on populism and the radical left in Europe and authored a monograph on the partition of Cyprus both forthcoming in 2019. He also participated for many years in the bi-communal peace movement in Cyprus. 

A note of the essence of the Cyprus problem

The essence of the Cyprus problem, we have said it many times, is the refusal of the Greek Cypriot leadership and by extension the majority of the g/c community, to accept the Turkish Cypriot community as a Cypriot political entity with which to co-exist equitably and to co-decide the future of the country. This was the cause of the Cyprus problem in 1950, this led to the conflict in 1963, this was the backdrop behind the 1974 tragedy, and this is until today the reason why we have no solution.

There are two majoritarian g/c perspectives and narratives about the t/c community, differentiated but differently problematic. Sometimes state political calculation unites them creating a great contradiction. But the reason why this contradiction stands, in spite of its apparent absurdity, is the deeper essence of a dominant g/c refusal to accept t/c in terms of parity. The first narrative regards the Turkish Cypriot community as an instrument of Turkey, as a part of the (eternal) enemy, and as a foreign body on this "Greek island". This is the position of the deep g/c state, which denies t/c their Cypriotness. Before 1974, this position culminated in the slogan "the enemy to the sea" and its consequences are the bones that are being excavated today from group graves. The second narrative considers the Turkish Cypriot community as a problematic disadvantageous Cypriot element, a victim also of Turkey, which can be tolerated with some cultural autonomy but in no circumstances with constitutionally guaranteed collective political rights. Prior to 1974, this position culminated in the attempt to abolish the bi-communalism of the constitution and to transform the t/c community into a minority. This narrative denies t/c their Turkishness as a precondition for their acceptance.

But both "the Greeks and the Turks cannot do together" and "we were doing just fine with the Turks before 1974" are half truths. The whole truth (and by extension the creation of a whole Cyprus) is the recognition of political equality in practice and the will to share power in a federal state. We said, the truth must always be said, and we ought to say it.

here the text can be found also in Greek, Turkish and Spanish

https://sevgululudag.blogspot.com/2018/11/kbrs-sorununun-ozu-nedir-what-is.html

Social Dialogue: International best practices and Recommendations for united Cyprus

Social Dialogue: International best practices and Recommendations for united Cyprus

Gregoris Ioannou

[commissioned study for Cyprus Dialogue Forum] 

1. Introduction:

Social Dialogue has been a key achievement of humanity and as a practice has now almost one Century of history in the developed world. It is a central concept both in the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda and the EU’s social model but has faced considerable strains during the economic crisis and is in need to modernize and develop further, finding the best possible mechanisms, processes and contexts in which it can be conducted. However, above all for social dialogue practices to have meaning and effect, “serious political commitment and sustained collaborative effort” is needed. There is a wide diversity of national social dialogue institutions in EU countries and there is no ideal model and “one size fits all” as these reflect historical traditions, and socio-political and economic circumstances that shape national contexts (Guardiancich and Molina [eds.], 2017).

Based on the current existing social dialogue practices in the GCC and TCC and the environment in which social dialogue takes place as outlined in the two relevant CDF Reports, this Report aims to briefly examine selected alternative forms of social dialogue operating in other countries and a) identify those international best practices that could more efficiently and effectively be adopted or that could inform a united Cyprus context and  b) suggest the steps that need to be taken for this direction. The benefits, difficulties, prerequisites and implications in this endeavor are discussed and c) the Recommendations are summed up and specified along with some concluding remarks. The international examples selected are drawn primarily from EU countries and rely on the most recent research conducted by the ILO and by Eurofound on behalf of the European Commission and the recommendations made after the study of social dialogue in the conditions of the economic crisis.

      2. Social dialogue international best practices:

Social dialogue contexts and processes differ across countries as there is a variety of industrial relations models (Eurofound, 2018a). Social dialogue occurs in a bi-partite form alongside and connected to collective bargaining, but more often in a tripartite form involving both general and specific issues (ILO, 2017). It also operates at different levels – usually national and sectoral but also sometimes at a regional and at an enterprise level. The degree of its institutionalization, frequency of meetings, scope and depth of consultation processes and actual impact on policy making varies across countries but overall it can be said that the main tripartite social dialogue bodies have an advisory role with the governments maintaining the leading role.

Although social dialogue has been generally weakened during the crisis in various ways, or has been unable in many countries to play a substantial role in crisis management there are European examples where in fact social dialogue has been strengthened during the recent economic crisis. These are France, Germany, Netherlands, Slovakia and Sweden (ILO, 2018). Germany and Sweden do not have a tradition of statutory tripartism but have instead fairly elaborate bi-partite social dialogue bodies and extensive collective bargaining. In 2014 Germany has instituted a Minimum Wage Commission authorized to decide on increases in the minimum wage every two years. This commission is chaired by an appointment of the Federal Labour Minister and composed by trade union and employer representatives and academic experts for a five year term. In Germany, in addition to the formal channels, informal, ad hoc meetings of the social partners took place in order to deal with the emergency situation arising from the crisis. These “crisis summits” called by the state and involving several relevant federal ministries, were used to present and discuss the social partners’ views on appropriate crisis responses, started before the crisis and continued after it (Lesch and Vogel, 2017). Ad hoc, non formalized social dialogue in Germany has been very effective in providing responses to the crisis such as negotiating reduced working time to avoid layoffs (ILO, 2018).

France at the other extreme end has a tradition of an active role of the state and intervention through extension mechanisms in collective bargaining and legislative tools. In 2007 France has enacted a new law granting the social partners consultation rights “in relation to any government project or prior to any draft bill on reforms in the area of labour relations, employment or vocational training” (Karnite, 2016). Although consultation rights do not necessarily translate into substantive deliberation, it did lead into more frequent meetings and discussions, strengthening the form and process of social dialogue (Freyssinet, 2017). Effectively this has institutionalized an already occurring phenomenon, boosting it symbolically through its legal consolidation.

Unlike in many EU countries, in Slovakia anti-crisis measures were first discussed at the country’s Economic and Social Council before being adopted (Eurofound, 2018a). In addition the “tripartite plus” Council for the Economic Crisis was established in 2009 playing a leading role in the formulation of the Government’s response to the crisis replaced in 2012 by the Council of Solidarity and Development (Cziria, 2017). Good and early planning and professional preparation of the meetings was important in addition to the political commitment not to interrupt and even strengthen further the social dialogue process during the crisis period. Another good practice in Slovakia, which has experimented with the consecutive establishment of various peak level tripartite bodies in the last two decades in search of efficiency and according to political dynamics, is the publication of the minutes and the holding of press conference after national level social dialogue meetings (Cziria, 2017).

In the Netherlands, although trade unions were weakened through rising labour market flexibility and falling trade union density undermining their legitimacy in social dialogue, there was no rupture with past and the Polder Model which has social dialogue at the heart of labour relations and social policy has survived. The Dutch social partners have reached agreements during and after the crisis on issues such as “wages; social and employment policies (including implementation of EU Directives); industrial relations and labour law, including collective bargaining practice and procedures; and anti-crisis measures on competitiveness and productivity” (Dekkers, Bekker and Cremmers, 2017). Also employers and trade unions have recently accepted one seat less for each, allowing two organizations representing the self-employed to also be represented in the Social and Economic Council, the supreme tripartite body of Netherlands (Dekkers, Bekker and Cremmers, 2017).

The participation of the social partners in the EU Semester can also be considered as an international best practice, at least at the level of intention for EU policy makers. Although in many instances more formal than substantive and still lagging behind the more elaborate and comprehensive social dialogue mechanisms and procedures at national level of most EU member states, it has the potential to systematize and perhaps revitalize social dialogue practices in EU member states, especially in those states where the crisis undermined or marginalized it almost pushing it out of existence. Although the emphasis so far has been procedural (Eurofound 2017) emphasis has been shifting to social partner capacity building (Weber and Pavlovaite, 2018; Eurofound , 2018b) which is expected to be the central dimension in the next years (Eurofound, 2019 forthcoming).   

        3. Adapting suitable social dialogue examples and suggestions for directions in a united Cyprus context:

Although the positive contribution that social dialogue can have on the economy and society is recognized in both communities of Cyprus and there is already significant institutionalization of social dialogue mechanisms and processes in both sides, there are substantial imbalances and weaknesses, especially in the TCC (Sonan, 2018). Unlike the Republic of Cyprus which has ratified the ILO Convention on Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) 144 (1976) in 1977 and operates since then a full-fledged tripartite system, the Turkish Cypriot Community has a much simpler and less comprehensive system in place. In the GCC, although a more elaborate system is in place this has been weakened during the crisis and although some improvement took place in the last years, social dialogue has not returned to the pre crisis levels in terms of depth and substance. Moreover the changing environment in the labour market already in place and the much bigger challenges that will inevitably escort the reunification process, point to the direction of reform and strengthening of the social dialogue context in general.

Given that labour law and labour and social policy will need to be unified in principle and operate at the level of the federal state a series of measures will have to be adopted in order to facilitate the transition to the united Cyprus context and maintain the social dialogue environment at the optimum level. Building strong social dialogue mechanisms that can oversee the reunification process is necessary in order to deal swiftly with the problems in the labour market and possible negative socio-economic developments that may arise. If a well functioning bi-communal, social partner consultation system is established from day 1, the transition can be achieved smoothly and this will also increase stability, the sense of security and social ownership of the reunification process[1].

Steps need to be taken in three directions:
 A) Strengthening of the legal framework of social dialogue.

Making consultation a legal right of the social partners and an obligation of the state will contribute to the systematization of discussions and the development of a social dialogue culture in a United Cyprus. Especially since a new political order will be in the process of construction after an agreement is ratified, the establishment by federal law of a series of tripartite bodies (see below) can both, place social dialogue on a stable footing especially in the transitional period, and allow ownership of the reunification process assisting in its social legitimization. In the medium term, establishing a comprehensive, well structured tripartite system will contribute to the democratization process and effective and socially balanced decision making and law making on labour, social and economic policy.

B) Enhancing the autonomy, representativeness and strength of social partners.

This requires an active concerted effort by the state and the social partners that needs to take various forms. First of all it requires the political commitment of the political leaderships that the social partners will be a pillar of the reunification process and that tripartite social dialogue will be at the heart of the united Cyprus project. From this, it follows that measures, which so far have not been considered, will be adopted in order to build a new effective consultation system. This would involve legislative reforms and administrative practices in order to protect unionization, especially in the Turkish Cypriot Community’s private sector including stricter inspections and better enforcement of existing laws with zero tolerance to anti-unionization practices by some employers. It will also need to involve changes in the institutional framework in order to improve the balance of power between the two sides in specific industries and measures to combat the fragmentation of the social partners. On the organizational side, and under the leadership of the social partners themselves, the aim should be the increase in social partners’ membership density and representativeness and enhancement of expertise and capacity of involvement in collective bargaining and social dialogue more generally.  

         C) Smooth operation of the labour market and harmonization and unification of social insurance systems.

Pre-emptive measures need to be adopted to prevent social dumping, observation mechanisms need to be instituted to inform the social dialogue bodies (regular as well as emergency ones) about possible interventions to be made as issues arise and a standing committee including experts should take over the planning of the merge of the social insurance systems in the medium term. The pre-emptive measures could involve the institutionalization of a national (federal) minimum wage and basic employment benefits that would protect the most vulnerable segment of the labour force. Beyond reducing work inequalities and allowing decent conditions in non unionized sectors, a “minimum wage and basic benefits package” can also serve as the starting point from where trade unions and employers can collectively bargain at sectoral or enterprise level better deals and more elaborate employment terms where the balance of power between the two sides allows it. In this way protective legislation will complement collective bargaining procedures. Measures are also needed in order to follow the situation in the labour market as it evolves and steps should be taken for the gradual unification of social insurance.

4. Specifying the Recommendations:

-          Establishment of a “Labour and Social Policy Council” by means of federal legislation (that will replace the Labour Consultative Assembly of the RoC and the Social and Economic Council in the Turkish Cypriot Community). Using federal legislation in order to set this peak tripartite body has both a practical and a symbolic function. On the one hand, assigning a statutory status to social dialogue and proclaiming to all that the state of United Cyprus is oriented towards the logic of social partnership. This peak tripartite body should be convened regularly (2 or 3 times per year) as well as additionally on extraordinary or emergency occasions when the government decides so. The main trade unions and employers’ organizations from both communities should be represented at the highest level and from the state’s side the Minister of Labour heading the meetings should be accompanied by high ranking competent civil servants. This body should operate as the main vehicle for social dialogue on general issues of labour and social policy and legislation at the top level. Although the government will have a leading role, the social parties should also have the right to jointly determine the agenda.

-          Establishment of the United Cyprus Committee of Employment, with a special focus on issues of combating unemployment, promoting training and more broadly overseeing the smooth operation of the labour market. Beyond employment issues, this could also be the body in which labour relations issues are discussed and common statements, campaigns and agreements decided as to how a more balanced labour market institutional framework could be promoted, representativeness enhanced, trust between social partners built and problems with inadequate compliance with standards set in collective agreements dealt with.   

-          Establishment of a Minimum Wage and Basic Employment Benefits Commission. This can follow the German model outlined above with the appointment of academic experts in addition to the social partner representatives and have a fixed term of service and a regular bi-annual review of the national minimum wage. The benefit from the establishment of such body is both substantive and procedural. The institutionalization of a national minimum wage and basic employment benefits will offer a minimum protection net for the weaker in the labour market and prevent social dumping that may appear amidst the capital movements during the transitional period. At the procedural level, the 5 year term appointments of social partners’ representatives and academic experts is expected to allow the development of mutual understanding, in-depth exchange of views and placing discussions on a scientific basis resulting in a consensual or at least majority decision on the bi-annual review.

  

-          Establishment of a Coordinating Committee for the convergence and unification of the Social Insurance Systems. This will need to be also tripartite in spirit but should involve experts as well, while functionaries from the two social insurance systems of the constituent states will also need to be part of it. Its aim will be the systematic study of the factors and parameters affecting the convergence and unification of social insurance, devise plans and scenarios, discuss problems and solutions and mediate between the federal government and the government of the two constituent states.

 5. Concluding remarks:

The international examples chosen and suggestions made above are of course indicative and briefly outlined and aim to serve the opening of the discussion between the social partners in the two communities in Cyprus. Successful practices abroad can only inform possible practices in Cyprus and cannot offer any detailed blueprints.  As stated in the introduction, the examples are drawn from EU countries, in which Cyprus belongs and in which social dialogue is most advanced. The recent economic crisis and the strains it placed on social dialogue constitutes a background upon which the different institutional arrangements can be evaluated in terms of their resilience.

Through the review of the most recent trends and the paths chosen by different countries in response to the crisis with respect to tripartism, some general directions, given the current actual state of affairs and the prevailing normative positions at the level of declarations by both the EU and the ILO, are suggested. These directions are specified with concrete recommendations about the establishment of structures and mechanisms that will enable social dialogue escort, condition, shape and influence the transition from a divided to a united Cyprus minimizing risks and maximizing social and political benefits.

References:

Cziria, L. (2017) Sustaining social dialogue though the crisis: The Slovakian experience, in Guardiancich, I. and Molina, O. (eds.) Talking through the crisis: Social dialogue and industrial relations trends in selected EU countries, ILO, Geneva

Dekker, R., Bekkers, S. and Cremers, J. (2017) The Dutch polder model: Resilience in times of crisis, in Guardiancich, I. and Molina, O. (eds.) Talking through the crisis: Social dialogue and industrial relations trends in selected EU countries, ILO, Geneva.

Guardiancich, I. and Molina, O. (eds.) (2017) Talking through the crisis: Social dialogue and industrial relations trends in selected EU countries, ILO, Geneva.

Eurofound. (2017) Involvement of the national social partners in the European Semester: 2016 update, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

Eurofound. (2018a) Country profiles.

Eurofound. (2018b) Involvement of the national social partners in the European Semester 2017: Social dialogue practices, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

Eurofound (2019 forthcoming) Exploring how to support capacity building for effective social dialogue

Freyssinet, J. (2017) Social dialogue in the shadow of the State in France, in Guardiancich, I. and Molina, O. (eds.) Talking through the crisis: Social dialogue and industrial relations trends in selected EU countries, ILO, Geneva.

ILO (2017) Voice matters: Consultation (Industrial and National Levels) Recommendation, 1960 (No. 113), ILO, Geneva.

ILO. (2018) Social dialogue and tripartism, Report VI, ILO, Geneva.

Ioannou, G. (2018) Social Dialogue Environment in the Greek Cypriot Community, Cyprus Dialogue Forum

Karnite, R. (2016), An attempt to revitalize social dialogue and national industrial relations systems in some of the CEECs – Lessons learnt and best practices in the way out of the crisis, final report, http://socdial.eu/page/2679/html/expert-materials.html

Lesch, H. and Vogel, S. (2017) Working together: Germany’s response to the global economic and financial crisis, in Guardiancich, I. and Molina, O. (eds.) Talking through the crisis: Social dialogue and industrial relations trends in selected EU countries, ILO, Geneva.

Molina, O. and Guardiancich, I. (2017) Comparative overview: National trajectories and good practices in social dialogue, in Guardiancich, I. and Molina, O. (eds.) (2017) Talking through the crisis: Social dialogue and industrial relations trends in selected EU countries, ILO, Geneva.

Sonan, S. (2018) Social Dialogue Environment in the Turkish Cypriot Community, Cyprus Dialogue Forum

Weber, T. and Pavlovaite, I. (2018), EU Social Partners’ project on “The European Social Fund: Supporting Social Dialogue at National, Regional and Local Levels”, Final report, Integrated Projects of the EU Social dialogue 2016-2018

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[1] For this to be achieved, the social partners will need to be in closer communication with the two leaders and their teams from the negotiation stage, and be ready to come up with detailed proposals concerning the social dialogue process of united Cyprus immediately after the agreement is reached.