Παρασκευή, 24 Φεβρουαρίου 2017

Euronews interview: the labour market and the reunification of Cyprus

Below is an 8 minute video of the interview I gave to euronews on labour market issues in relation to the reunification process.

Gregoris Ioannou is a Greek Cypriot sociologist, teaching at Frederick University in Nicosia. He has co-authored, with his Turkish Cypriot colleague Sertac Sonan, a study on youth unemployment on the island.
He talks to euronews reporter Valerie Gauriat about the current state of the labour market, and what could be hoped from a future integration. And insists that labour laws should also be unified, in order to avoid social dumping.

Δευτέρα, 6 Φεβρουαρίου 2017

Establishing a federal Cyprus: the regional and domestic forces at play

article by Gregoris Ioannou and Giorgos Charalambous published in Open Democracy

What are the regional and domestic forces helping - and hindering - a federal solution to the Cyprus issue?
A general view of Turkish controlled Cyprus from the roof of the former Ledra Palace Hotel inside the United Nations Buffer Zone between the Greek and Turkish controlled areas of the island. PAimages/Chris Ison. All rights reserved.
Following up from our previous article three months ago, we attempt to offer some analytic explanations concerning the process of negotiating Cyprus and to take a political position in it.
It is safe to say that the Cyprus peace process, with the aim of establishing a type of federal state, is moving towards its conclusion in the next months. There cannot be business as usual after this: either there will be an agreement or a collapse of the negotiations, with a theoretical starting point some years later and under probably different political circumstances and with different stakes and aims.  
Still, there remains political and diplomatic play to unfold, of which the importance is vividly illustrated in the absence of public predictions by the key players as to the eventual result of the ongoing process. It is unclear whether a high level convergence among major powers will materialize and shape the way for a referendum. Even then, it is also unclear whether the public is likely to accept - by a convenient majority - even the most mutually favourable plan.

On imperialism and ‘mother lands’

It has become obvious recently that the broader relations between Turkey and Greece - especially with respect to the demarcation of the Exclusive Economic Zones between the two states - is a key parameter of the peace process in Cyprus. The balance of power between Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean in general and in Cyprus in particular has been a key factor of the problem since the 1950s.
After the partition of Cyprus in 1974, a quasi equilibrium was reached with Turkey having the upper hand in the military field and Greece in the diplomatic field. As the Republic of Cyprus in Greek Cypriot hands was reinforced, it began resembling a de facto second Greek state. In a similar manner, the Turkish Cypriot Republic of Northern Cyprus (established in 1983), remains financially and logistically dependent on the Turkish state.
It is evident that in the run up to the Geneva talks a few weeks ago, Greek-Turkish relations have become more autonomous from broader bi-lateral relations, regional institutions and global alliances. The negotiations demonstrate so far pretty much an image of Greece vs Turkey, without a clear position from the main powers involved (excepting the UN) toward pushing one or the other towards a more compromising stance.
In the effort of both sides to maintain a tough line, they also make loud statements aimed primarily for domestic consumption, but at the same time impacting negatively on the peace process and the climate in which it occurs. The quintessence of a hostile climate concerns the issue of trust by the people who will be called upon to vote for the agreement; the perception of the ‘barbaric Turk’ by the Greek Cypriots and of the ‘arrogant and nationalist Greek’ by the Turkish Cypriots has become consolidated as embodying concrete threats that may come to haunt them in a re-unified island.
In any case, the rivalry between Greece and Turkey is much bigger than Cyprus, and it is in this frame that the opposing statements from leading officials from the two governments need to be interpreted.
As the negotiations evolve it also becomes increasingly clear that in the north, Turkey has an even bigger role to play than Greece in the south. In the Greek Cypriot community, the newly emerging tough stance of Greece, is more an extra boost to the local rejectionist forces and status quo interests, in that it can delay and even derail the prospect of an agreement.
Withdrawal cannot be immediate and cannot be total. This is not a stance that can be legitimated in Turkey’s political system; it is contrary to Erdogan’s profile as a leader and to Turkish Cypriot anxieties, desires and expectations.
The Greek stance at the same time is subject to Greek Cypriot pro-reunification pressures. And if an agreement is eventually reached, there are enough resources amongst the Greek Cypriot rejectionist forces to fight against reunification, even in defiance of a Greek government.
In the Turkish Cypriot community, the situation is different, and in some respects opposite. The fragmentation of pro peace political forces and the decreasing pro reunification mobilization potential, the enhanced and deeper cultural and economic penetration of Turkey into north Cyprus since 2004 and the (largely structural) weakness of the Turkish Cypriot leader to transcend the commands of the Turkish government render Erdogan as effectively the key agent that can prevent an agreement from happening now, but who can also push it through a referendum if an agreement is made.
The reshaping of the geopolitical order after the collapse of the Soviet Union did not alter the balance in Cyprus, despite the changes occurring as both the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey began their path towards the EU. The negotiations in the early 1990s failed and the strategy of tension that followed created political conditions that obstructed the negotiations from proceeding to the final stage until the early 2000s, at the conjuncture when the Republic of Cyprus was to enter the EU and Turkey to gain the status of an EU candidate country. The rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots and the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU without its effective control of the northern part of the island has made the EU an important voice in the Cyprus problem as well.
This Greek Cypriot aim from the beginning becomes materialized only now, 13 years later in different circumstances and with EU and Turkey relations having taken a different form. The EU seeks to extend its control to north Cyprus through a solution of the Cyprus problem, ending not only an anomaly it has inherited, but also strengthening its geopolitical influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and its energy resources and routes.
Turkey seeks now to use Cyprus as a bargaining piece, not in order to pave its way into the EU as was the case 14 years ago, but in order to achieve recognition from the EU as a major power at its border with which the EU needs to have a special relationship. This new more direct EU-Turkey parameter in the Cyprus negotiation is not necessarily working in favor of reunification: it substantially enlarges the stakes and the issues under negotiation and may make an agreement more elusive at the present stage, and of a different sort in the medium term even by-passing the Greek Cypriot government of the Republic of Cyprus, if the current process collapses.
Although Turkey’s final cards have not been played on account of domestic instability and a foreign policy with many open fronts, its desire to exchange its withdrawal from Cyprus with an understanding with the EU and Greece is clearly visible, primarily but not exclusively through the attitude of the Turkish Cypriot leadership.
But that withdrawal cannot be immediate and cannot be total. This is not a stance that can be legitimated in Turkey’s political system; it is contrary to Erdogan’s profile as a leader and to Turkish Cypriot anxieties, desires and expectations. The treaty of guarantees will have to be revised, but it cannot just evaporate into thin air – nor can half a century of political and military presence in the island. 
The Turkish position on Cyprus goes far beyond the intransigence of the Erdogan regime and into the diachronic security concerns among the Turkish Cypriots as well as Turkey’s geopolitical status in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this vein, a transitional period with a small and symbolic Turkish military presence and some role by Turkey in the security system currently being discussed is inevitable. Any absolute refusal as to this and more specifically the demands for an immediate and absolute withdrawal of Turkish troops, even before the enforcement of the agreement and the total exclusion of Turkey from the security system are simply out of touch with reality. And this without any serious prospects to maintain the current state of affairs in the political and economic fronts; that is, the continuing monopolization of the Republic in Greek Cypriot hands.
There are significant issues that have not yet been agreed but the balance is more or less known and this will not lead to any one of the two sides retreating fully. Both will have to retreat so that they find themselves somewhere in the middle – rotating presidency with cross voting, the town of Morphou under Greek Cypriot administration but with rights of remain to the current population, total withdrawal of the Turkish army but at a gradual pace, abolition of Turkey’s right to unilateral intervention but maintaining Turkey in Cyprus’ security system.
The UN refrains from pressurizing the two sides but it is clear that at some point it will have to call an end game in the current process. And in case of a collapse of the negotiations, it will most probably orient itself to an even more reduced role in the next period. The resumption of the talks at high level may have been postponed for April after the referendum in Turkey about the constitutional reform, but it is doubtful whether any substantial change will occur then.
One may dismiss the Greek and Turkish governments’ nationalistic cries, yet there are material issues and real state interests besides the public opinion in the two countries. Although a compromise agreement between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus is very possible, it may not happen as both states see Cyprus as one piece in their broader interests and relations. In order to agree they must also reach a sort of understanding concerning the framework through which they would continue to compete and resolve the rest of their matters and specifically the demarcation of their exclusive economic zones.
On the bigger plane, an agreement on the Cyprus problem can only be based on the acceptance by the US and the UK that Russia cannot be ignored in the Eastern Mediterranean. There are signs that this is feasible as Russia’s endurance in the global plane and more specifically in the Middle East, has made it clear that an agreement in Cyprus can only take place if Russia supports, or at least tolerates it. This would be reflected in the role of the Security Council, the transitional periods and the security system to be instituted.
A border crossing on Ledra Street, which separates the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot parts of Nicosia. PAimages/Jens Kalaene. All rights reserved.

Politics on the ground: the two intra-communal camps

The main development in the last three months is the further strengthening of the two camps in favour and against the reunification process. In parallel, the cleavage separating them at both the social and political levels has been reinforced in discursive, organizational as well as political terms.
Fascist and other right wing street protests against the peace process and the prospect of a federal solution are becoming a standard. Protests come along with a series of other public events, such as panel discussions, petitions, open letters etc, by the “five centre parties”, ELAM and Church leaders as well as other nationalist and far-right wing groups, intellectuals and opinion leaders.
In Cyprus, violence is not seen as an immediate concern, but rather a divisive mark from the past.
The clearest statements in favor of a solution and most willing to support the process from the trade unionists and from the peace activists, as does pro-solution mobilisation. Business representatives are more divided with statements both for and against. The fact that the two main parties AKEL and DISY, fully support Anastasiades’ negotiation effort at this conjuncture is highly significant. Since the mid-1980s when they united against then President’s Spyros Kyprianou’s intransigence in the negotiations, each of the two parties (and especially AKEL) has been very careful to draw clear boundaries from the other’s position on the Cyprus problem.
Yet, in line of successive developments, with Anastasiades building on and carrying forward joint decisions made by Christofias without changing much, the political gap between AKEL and DISY on this issue has shrunk. To be sure, both sides retreated on previous stances throughout time. DISY has backtracked on its position in favor of NATO’s involvement in the process and of a “loose” federation, while AKEL has retreated from an overt emphasis on procedural matters and has refused to succumb to rejectionist internal and external pressures.  
Partly because this division between AKEL and DISY is not simply a political matter, the two parties’ ideological incompatibility is likely to play a role in determining internal opposition. Specifically AKEL and DISY dissenters are both openly and covertly intervening against the negotiations and against the prospect of an agreement in the current circumstances. These include both high profile personalities, who tend to be more careful, but also lower rank and local cadres.
Left-wing rejectionists evoke various things such as patriotism, internationalism, anti-imperialism, nationalism and even anti-capitalism. The argument of the most coherent rejectionist line inside AKEL itself more or less argues that too much is being conceded to foreign imperialism, of which Turkish expansionism is a manifestation. Inside DISY, opposition is essentially more traditionally nationalist, not in civic terms but on more ethnocentric lines.
In the Turkish Cypriot community there is both continuity and change with respect to the political system and the various pro and anti reunification forces. The traditional right currently governing remains staunchly oppositional and undermines Mustafa Akinci’s efforts while occasionally clashing frontally with him using nationalist arguments and rhetoric. Old and new fascist and far right groups have also made their customary appearance, threatening the “traitors” and including in them not only trade unionists and leftists but also Akinci himself.
The traditional left, although weaker and more fragmented today, firmly supports the reunification process, albeit without a mass movement shaping the political climate this time. The pro EU business groups and many civil society organizations and NGOs are also in favor of reunification and so is that segment of Turkish Cypriot society that feels alarmed with the developments in Turkey and the drift towards authoritarianism there.
However, what seems to be holding the balance is the new centre-right party led by Kudret Özersay, who maintains close links with Turkey and who is ambivalent with respect to the reunification process. Although Özersay as a technocrat had supported reunification, as a politician today with polls showing his People’s Party as the most popular one in the north, he seems more interested in establishing himself in a pivot position in the political system.
Unlike the left which sees the future of the Turkish Cypriot community as passing through a federal Cyprus and unlike the right which sees value in the status quo, Özersay attempts to express a third position that prioritizes modernizing reform and Turkish Cypriot autonomy and refusing, for the moment, the dilemma of partition or federation.

Projections towards a pending definitive conclusion

The immediate purpose of agreements for ethno-nationalist conflict within countries is usually to freeze the military or paramilitary confrontations, and prevent violence from re-occurring. Both the Good Friday Agreement for Ireland and the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, can be seen as ‘constructions of necessity’.
This is not the case in Cyprus where violence is not (and is not seen as potentially) an immediate concern, but rather a divisive mark from the past, which is becoming all the more distant in the minds of the local populations and is further diluted by the increasingly multi-cultural demographic composition of the island.
This very fact makes an eventual agreement very uncertain in form and nature. Both actually resolving the conflict and freezing it through de facto or formal partition are still possible options for all the players involved as the need for a solution may not be seen as urgent either in the domestic or international sphere. Yet, for progressive Cypriots, north and south, reunification is a matter of urgency as well as necessity, in terms of both substance and in terms of the potential to be unleashed in the process.
If there is an agreement, a very polarized political conflict will unfold both north and south. But more so in the south where the outcome will be more uncertain and probably close. In the north since the agreement, if there is one, will have to be inevitably endorsed by the Turkish government, the nationalist rejectionist forces will be in a disadvantageous position.
In the Greek Cypriot community, the Greek government does not have this sort of leverage and will not be able to control the rejectionist forces. If there is no agreement, we expect changes to take place in the short and medium term. A deadlock will most probably be announced, a more blunt report should be expected from the UN and any future discussions will only take place after the passage of a couple years.
By then, the agency of different players could shape developments in different ways, most probably towards more partitionist directions.

Κυριακή, 6 Νοεμβρίου 2016

Establishing the United Federal Cyprus? A Preliminary Diagnosis

an article on the context of the current peace process: Gregoris Ioannou and Giorgos Charalambous, 5th November 2016

The process ahead leading to a possible agreement between the community leaders and submission to separate and simultaneous referenda is expected to be neither smooth nor easy. Although the outcome - partition or reunification – is still far from certain, since September the final phase of this process has been signaled. On Monday the two leaders will meet in Switzerland to discuss the land issue. Put differently, the final phase began at the time when the two leaders could no longer proclaim another stalemate. The conjuncture may be favorable as it has been before in the recent past, yet the broader context vaguely defined can fool the passing observer. The constellation of political, economic and ideological interests and forces opposing the reunification of Cyprus remains formidable and this will continue to be so until the referendum day. In view of a necessary and inevitable political battle on the ground, here we will attempt to outline and discuss the basic obstacles to the establishment of the United Federal Cyprus at the current conjuncture. 

The rejectionist forces
Rejectionism has been present in the Greek Cypriot party system since the latter’s very consolidation in the late 1970s, but there are today two distinct strands among the rejectionist political parties. On one level, there are those parties, mostly new and claiming a movement-type profile, which espouse Greek nationalism and articulate their opposition to all attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem on the basis of the so called Cyprus’ ‘Greekness’. These parties include two of the newest entrants into parliament – the National Popular Front or ELAM, archetypical of the European far right party family and the Movement for Solidarity, a breakaway party from DISY acting as an umbrella for the illiberal sections of the right – and mobilize on the basis of racism, xenophobia and national pride. 
On another level, there is Greek-Cypriot nationalism, as expressed by the traditional parties of the ‘centre’, Democratic Party (DIKO) and the social democrats (EDEK), as well as the newly formed Citizens Alliance, led by establishment politician, Giorgos Lillikas. Here, opposition to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation is more nuanced through legal(istic) arguments that are premised on the technical details of the establishment, autonomy and durability of federal and the two constituent states. This is accompanied by a rhetoric about human rights, the so called ‘racist’ nature of bi-zonality (seen as disadvantaging the Greek Cypriots) and Turkey’s violations of international law. Overall, the centre’s rejectionism ostensibly evokes a sort of liberal kind of nationalism, nevertheless based on an ethnocentric narrative and dressed in patriotic and humanitarian colors.
The rejectionist camp has expanded since the 2016 elections in terms of the number of institutionalized political actors with linkages to the state. If one includes the Greens, then currently ‘the centre’ οr the ‘in-between space’ is occupied by five nationalist or quasi-nationalist political parties. Adding to that the extreme rightist ELAM, makes 6 parties with a total of approximately 130,000 votes that position themselves, either implicitly or explicitly, against the Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation as a solution to the Cyprus problem. Beyond this politically institutionalized rejectionism, a considerable number of voters from DISY are also rather conservative and nationalist, while AKEL provides a roof for an ‘easy’ and verbal anti-imperialism, which can be (and has often been) reproduced as the vale of a dangerous ethnocentrism. If one is to contemplate a worst case scenario, then in the current conjuncture such stance is likely to be triggered also by the uncomfortable situation in which leftists (and especially the older generation) may find themselves in supporting a right-wing government’s initiatives on the Cyprus problem.
Although important sections of the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie seem to favor this time a re-unification of the island, something that was not the case in 2004 on the occasion of the Annan Plan referendum, the reasons that led many among the business circles to oppose re-unification in the previous decade have not vanished. In fact the fear of Greek Cypriot capitalists losing their competitive advantage in the sectors of tourism, commerce and real estate and their privileged connection with the state for offshore activities and taxation issues is probably now enhanced by the deeper penetration and take-over of the Turkish Cypriot economy by Turkish capital. 
On the other hand, the economic crisis in the Republic of Cyprus has wiped out or brought to their knees many small firms and has produced a large pool of unemployed and under-employed citizens. If amongst the winners of the crisis, consisting largely of accumulated capital, the key is the degree of their confidence with respect to the forthcoming competition in the more open national and regional markets after the country’s reunification, amongst the losers of the crisis the transition to a united Cyprus carries less anxiety and more expectations for better days amidst reconstruction and labour market expansion. Some sort of economic development will be an inevitable result of the reunification process. The question that remains open, however, is the form that this will assume in conjunction with the actual costs of financing reunification. How the various classes, class fractions and occupational interests perceive the process and position themselves within it remains uncertain. What is certain is that their mobilization and agency can and will affect the outcome today and set into motion the dynamics that will shape tomorrow the socio-economic realm of the united Cyprus.
Nationalism, in its various forms and gradations remains a strong force in both communities of Cyprus. The inter-communal conflict and the distancing of Greek and Turkish Cypriots have become entrenched in the social structures reproducing for more than two generations imaginaries of ethnic superiority, narratives of victimhood and symbols of division. Although nationalism is diffused in both societies, overcoming it to a degree sufficient for allowing the re-unification process to proceed is probably more difficult in the Greek Cypriot community. In spite of the latter being more accustomed to the experience of independence from the ‘mother land’, the idea of an ethnic superior claim to the ownership of the country (historical, cultural, demographic etc) remains hegemonic and obstructs the idea of power sharing and communal equality as enshrined in the model of the Bizonal Bicommunal Federation.
Although Cypriot-centrism has won the identity battle against Helleno-centrism in the ideological contest of the last decades, the Greek Cypriots’ Cypriot-centrism is not bi-communal and does not include the Turkish Cypriots as a significant part of its self-conceptualization. The educational system, the established media and the continuing influence and institutional strength of the Greek Orthodox Church have been instrumental in this. Within the context of an abundance and diversity of material resources, the Church has sustained an important level of social capital that equals or exceeds that of parties, parliament or government, even amidst a superficial religiosity on the island and remains a significant actor in the rejectionist camp. 

The geopolitical framework and the external dynamics
In terms of the international context, there are both continuities and changes with respect to the major powers in the area and the interrelations and balances that constitute the current geo-political nexus. The EU remains interested in consolidating its presence and influence in the eastern Mediterranean and the US continues to view a Greco-Turkish understanding in Cyprus as a stepping stone for a broader understanding concerning the relations between the two NATO member states. Both the EU and the US consider the resolution of the Cyprus problem as a “normalizing” moment that will neutralize a diplomatic and legal anomaly. Although at this conjucture they seem to retain their preference for a federal solution because it is diplomatically and legally easier, less risky and beneficial in terms of political profile, their commitment to federation is not of a political sort. If a compromise on a federal model is not feasible, the option of the formalization of the current partitionist status quo remains open for them. The increasingly volatile current regional and international conditions, where fluidity, uncertainty and realignment are the norms is a sufficient factor pushing and enabling this eventuality. 
Russia’s positioning in the region is also more secure than a decade ago, after the US has proved unable to control the Middle East and after Russia managed to withhold the quasi Cold War, Western, multi-level and multi-area pressures against it; there are signs that this is being acknowledged by the Western powers. The fact that the suggestion for a NATO security framework has been shelved and a multi-national one including Russia is currently being discussed is not only due to the Cypriot Left’s firm opposition to this but also an understanding by the West that Russia can neither be ousted from the Eastern Mediterranean nor ignored.  
The natural gas resources that have been discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean and the various designs as to how to make their extraction politically possible and economically profitable constitute a new and significant parameter driving the current peace process. Cyprus and the Cyprus natural gas is to be sure a detail in this and there are no certainties, nor inevitabilities as to how the imperialist and micro-imperialist dynamics will shape the alignments and competitions of the major players and powers, multinational corporations and major and regional states. 
What is directly relevant to Cyprus and the Cyprus peace process, are the conceptions of the Greek and the Turkish states concerning their own national interests. Although Greco-Turkish relations have been slowly but steadily improving in the last decades allowing the idea of a possible co-operation to mature among the elites and the peoples of the two neighboring countries, there are still fundamental divergences of interests and antagonistic frames with respect to how these interests can be pursued while militarist rationales and nationalist mentalities are still operational in both states and societies. 
This leaves the question of the natural gas extraction and the demarcation of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the two states an issue whose resolution will be pushed in the future and that will be subject to a variety of factors and dynamics internal to the two states as well as international. What is important from the Cypriot point of view is to secure the respect of Cyprus’s independence and relative autonomy from the broader dynamics of Greco-Turkish relations. A reunited island will render more difficult the export of further Greek and Turkish nationalism into Cyprus and the use of Cyprus as a bargaining piece or as a field upon which tensions can be directed, used and abused. 
The first actor from the ‘near outside’ to take a negative stance on the Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation has been the Greek Communist Party. It reformulated its opposition to the proposed solution, seeking an ‘advantage’ in the debate on the Cyprus problem in Greece. Its explanation is labeled anti-imperialist, in solidarity with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot working classes and anti-nationalist. In concrete terms, the KKE supports a single state solution, which will be established through popular, bottom-up mobilization, rather than intra-imperialist alliances and contradictions involving a key role by the EU and NATO. 
Yet, the Greek communists seem to forget how complex the nationalities question was in one of their main reference points, the former Soviet Union, itself a federation, in fact based on the political institutionalization of the multiple ethnicities into autonomous constituent republics. Accommodating ethno-national heterogeneity more often than not requires institutionalizing ethnicities as constitutive elements of the state and its citizenry, and this is not a requirement operating only in capitalist countries but also in centrally planned economies. Quintessentially, the structures of the single state failed in the past in Cyprus because they did not manage to co-opt the ethnic narratives of the two main communities. They will fail today because ethnic identities are not only even more socially and anthropologically consolidated but also deeply politicized, carrying their recent antagonistic orientations and the legacy of their conflict.  

In terms of method, there is nothing constructive in KKE’s proclamations that can offer a convincing formula that will obstruct the further reinforcement of nationalism, evade foreign intervention and overturn the de facto partition. The Cyprus problem is embedded in imperialist and neo-imperialist alignments and this cannot be overturned by any kind of popular mobilization, let alone through verbalism, selective consideration of historical determining parameters and idealizations that confront not only political realism, but the political reality itself. In other words, in the short- and medium-term the incorporation of the Cyprus problem into the existing geopolitical dynamics cannot be substantively undone and must be taken into consideration in order to support progressive goals such as reunification rather than used as excuse for inaction and withdrawal, thus allowing others to shape the course of events. 
KKE’s analysis is, to say the least, superficial in confusing analytically the concepts of partition and federation both in terms of the lead up and in terms of the outcome of the peace process. This is because it comprehends partition as a consequence of the establishment process of the United Cyprus Republic viewing the legal and constitutional arrangements statically in terms of the current conditions and as producing political results, rather than dynamically and as being the result of the political act of the inter-communal compromise agreement. Politically, its understanding of both the Annan Plan and the current agreed framework as confederal and therefore as a prioriunacceptable, places the party in terms of its argumentation squarely within the rejectionist forces represented in Cyprus by the traditional ‘centrist’ Greek Cypriot parties. These deny the Turkish Cypriot community both the right to autonomy and power sharing, as well as communal agency, viewing the Turkish Cypriots effectively as inherently, inevitably and irreversibly the extension of Turkish imperialism.

A political battle on the ground is necessary and inevitable and it is already unfolding between politicians and citizens in the public sphere, the social media and the streets. If arguments in favor of the federal reunification mobilize effectively and if the main foreign and international players continue to support the process avoiding what could be taken as provocative statements in an already nationalist climate, then a solution may be possible. The number of changes in social, electoral and political dynamics since the referendum of 2004 must not be forgotten, as they will determine several parameters of what is to follow. 
Although the battle will primarily be a partisan one, interests will also mobilize beyond partisan lines. Parties are not as strong as before and party allegiances have been significantly eroded in the past decade or so, increasing the distance between the voters and their parties. High abstention, especially among the youth, a public outcry for corruption practices and political disaffection are now the key characteristics of public opinion among Greek Cypriots. The same applies in the north, although there pro reunification forces have less of an uphill road ahead of them than their Greek Cypriot partners. It should not be neglected that where ultimately public opinion sways in the end over the Cyprus problem negotiations may be driven less by political allegiances and more by emotional appeals and ideational arguments and discursive frames. 
Nevertheless, the reunification prospect presupposes the effective and widespread deconstruction of rejectionist argumentation, the neutralization of the narrow ethnocentric mentality and the containment of conservatism and the micro-interests of the anti-reunification forces. This is a different conjuncture in comparison to 2004, a different climate and with different stakes. If the negotiations are successful, it still remains a question as to whether the referendum will have a positive outcome; at least for the time being.

published in:  http://chronos.fairead.net/establishing-the-ufc

Παρασκευή, 14 Οκτωβρίου 2016

Youth Unemployment in Cyprus. Presentation of the FES Report

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the University of Nicosia cordially invite you to the conference

Youth Unemployment in Cyprus
Presentation of the FES Report by Sertac Sonan and Gregoris Ioannou

Friday, 21 October 2016, 9.30 – 18.00

UNESCO Amphitheatre, University of Nicosia, Nicosia Open to the public
Youth unemployment is a huge problem in Europe and on both sides of the divide. The FES has asked two Cypriot researchers to investigate the causes of youth unemployment on the island in a comprehensive study. On the occasion of the launch of the report this study and the problem of youth unemployment in Europe in general will be discussed by representatives from labour unions, officials, representatives of employers’ associations and involved actors from civil society.

9.30 Opening Addresses by
Emilios Solomou, Executive Vice President for Administration and Director of the UNESCO Chair of the University of Nicosia
Hubert Faustmann, Director of the Office of FES in Cyprus

9.45: Panel 1:
9.45 – 11.00: Youth Unemployment in Europe
Hans Dietrich, Institute for Labour Market and Professional Research:
Unemployment in Europe and Strategies to Combat it

11.00 – 11.30 Coffee Break

11.30 – 13.00 Panel II: Youth Unemployment in the north
Sertac Sonan, Presentation of the Youth Unemployment Report
Hasan Yıkıcı, (Dev-İş)
Süleyman Gelener, (KTÖS)
Employers’ Representative (not confirmed yet)
İsmet Lisaniler, (Retired official from the north)

13.00 – 14.30 Lunch Break

14.30 – 16.00 Panel III Youth Unemployment in the south
Gregoris Ioannou, Presentation of the Youth Unemployment Report
Nikos Gregoriou, PEO, Economic and Social Policy Bureau
Tasos Kakoullis, Secretary of SEK Youth SEK Lena Panayiotou, OEB, Senior Industrial Relations & Social Policy Officer (10 minutes)
Official from the Ministry of Labor (tbc)

16.00 – 16.30 Coffee Break

16.30 - 18.00 Panel IV: The Social Impact of Youth Unemployment in Europe and Cyprus
Hans Dietrich, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung
Nadia Karayianni, NGO Support Centre, Member of Board of Directors
Celal Özkızan (Bağımsızlık Yolu)

18.00 End of the Event


and a 15 minute audio interview to Rosie Charalambous (Cyprus Mail) about it here

Πέμπτη, 6 Οκτωβρίου 2016

Youth Unemployment in Cyprus An Examination of the "Lost Generation"

co-authored with Sertac Sonan, 
commissioned by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

Youth unemployment has been rapidly rising in the Republic of Cyprus in the last decade and now stands above the figure in the northern part of Cyprus. Youth unemployment in the Republic of Cyprus stands significantly above the EU and Euro area average.

While youth unemployment has always been chronically high in the northern part of Cyprus, it has been declining in the last three years reaching a level slightly below the Euro Area. 

The big proportion of higher education graduates and the strength of the institution of the family in both sides at the same time reinforce and control the social impact of the problem. The same applies for the individual-oriented programmes such as the ones in force at EU and national levels, which cannot provide medium or longterm solutions. 

The problem is structural and connected to the broader deterioration of labour market conditions. Active labour market policies need to be implemented alongside a comprehensive regulatory framework that strengthens collective bargaining in combination with public and private investment.

the full report is available here

Πέμπτη, 11 Αυγούστου 2016

Trade unions and politics in Cyprus: a historical comparative analysis across the dividing line

This article is the first comparative study on the historical development of trade unions in Cyprus. It assesses the impact of the historical trajectory and ethnic division on the contemporary condition of the trade unions, which substantially diverge from each other. It compares and contrasts the framework, conditions and forms of trade unionism across the dividing line, focusing on the current conjuncture and accounts for them using a historical institutionalist approach. It concludes that disparity is likely to persist although recent austerity policies have been posing similar challenges to the trade unions on boths sides of the divide.

Key words: trade unions, north Cyprus, Republic of Cyprus, economic crisis, historical institutionalism, path dependence

with Sertac Sonan - forthcoming in "Mediterranean Politics"

Τετάρτη, 25 Μαΐου 2016

Genealogies of activism and the semiotics of urban space: cultural and social practices in 21st Century inner Nicosia

Key words: Nicosia, social movements, urban activism, cultural practices, politics

This article aims to trace the development of urban activism centered in the area of inner Nicosia (focusing on its southern part) as this was manifested in the last two decades. It examines a variety of cultural and social practices and their political implications in terms of their interaction with the surrounding space and wider society. The analysis focuses on specific initiatives and small social movements contesting existing institutions, structures and processes and engaging in semiotic struggles over the definition and interpretation of the city and the right to it. It thus offers an account of the development of an open community rooted in inner Nicosia formed on the basis on social networks and cultural traits as these have been constituted through specific politics and ideational frames.