Πέμπτη 9 Μαΐου 2013

The intervention of the Church of Cyprus in politics


commentary article presented at the conference on 
Political Institutions in the Republic of Cyprus
organised by: Institue of Commonwealth Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
On 1st of March 2013 at the University of Nicosia


The intervention of the Church of Cyprus in politics

Gregoris Ioannou

It is widely accepted that the Church of Cyprus had managed to accumulate enormous wealth and influence during the Ottoman times rendering it the key institution in which economic, ideological and political power rested by the end of the 19th Century1. This often made it a field of contestation within which different social forces and political tendencies competed with each other with the key examples being the archiepiscopal elections serials of the 1900s and the late 1940s2. Although in the rapid modernisation context of the first half of the 20th Century, there have been significant challenges to its ruling position, with the Colonial Authorities and a liberal section of the bourgeoisie on the one hand and the Cypriot Left on the other being its main competitors in the battle for hegemony, the Church emerged by the 1950s as the unquestionable winner3.

The Left in the form of AKEL had watered down completely its critique of the Church as a reactionary institution, its leaders refrained from promoting atheism and the party threw its weight within the Church ranks with its members entering parish committees and campaigning for the election of the least anti-communist clerics to the Church hierarchy. The liberals succumbed quickly during the 1950s to the dominance of the right wing, anti-communist strand of nationalism which had triumphed by 1949 in the Greek civil war at a time of global climax of the Cold War and which was sanctioned by the Church hierarchy. By the end of the 1950s the Colonial Authorities were negotiating the terms of their exit from Cyprus handing over the power to the personnel of EOKA and TMT respectively. The fact that the political leader of EOKA and head of the Church became the first president of the Republic (remaining in power until his death), effectively gave the notion of “Ethnarchy” its full political meaning and materiality.

Makarios as the intersection of Church and state

Makarios was not only the product, the expression or the symptom of the historical trajectory that allowed the traditional institution of the Church of Cyprus to emerge with a strengthened political role after the completion of the modernisation process. He was also an active agent with a role and an important contribution, shaping that is in various ways and to a significant extent the state which he bequeathed to his political heirs. There was no real questioning of the continued and enhanced presence of the Church in the politics of the country, and even when Makarios' opponents attempted to challenge his dual role as president and archbishop, it was obvious that this had all to do with Makarios' policy and nothing with secularism. In fact Makarios' opponents themselves challenged him decisively within the Church in the form of the “three bishops' coup” as well, acknowledging that is the power he drew as a political leader from his role as a religious leader and effectively reinforcing the established link between organised religion and politics. At the same time this worked the opposite way as well. Secular leftists and democrats in the troubled times of the late 1960s and 1970s found themselves with no other alternative than to support directly or indirectly Makarios against the extreme nationalist right whose links with the military dictatorship in Greece were evident and which constituted an obvious threat for whatever peace and democracy had been achieved thus far. On first sight a slogan such as “You will never win. You will kneel before the Archbishop” seems an overtly conservative one, yet when placed in its post 1974 coup context, one understands how and why it came to be chanted by leftists and democrats against armed EOKA B gangs. Summing up that is, the question of legitimation in the Church – politics nexus has been two directional. Makarios was able to gather substantial support as a political leader because he headed the Church, but at the same time as a political leader he was able to sustain a political role for the Church, accepted or at least tolerated by secularists.

By the death of Makarios in 1977, the post colonial political system in Cyprus had been more or less stabilised. The division of the country started to be tacitly accepted (and beyond the rhetoric to seem) as long term, a territorially demarcated federation had been agreed as the form of the future solution of the Cyprus problem, the housing and the reconstruction process was speeded up, class peace for the benefit of the homeland firmly established, civil war averted, Makarios' heirs held state power and the coupists were forgiven as far as the state was concerned and housed in a broader right wing party DISI, founded and headed by the liberal pro western politician, Clerides. Makarios' supporters comprised the other two main political parties, DIKO as his party par excellence and EDEK as the party of his trusted man Lyssaridis, the so called patriotic forces allied until the early 1990s with AKEL. Chrysostomos I, who took over as the new archbishop (with some exceptions such as the campaign for the set up of an extra special defence fund) generally refrained from direct, continuous or frequent intervention in politics, leaving Makarios' political heirs to do their job, provided of course that he kept his say over education and Cyprus problem matters and to the extent that he more or less agreed with the orientations of their politics.

A sort of symbiotic relationship was developed between the politicians and the Church leaders respecting each others' institutional autonomy yet cooperating closely and being complementary aspects of the communal organisation and ideological imaginary. The Church was no longer going to be a field within which politics would be played out but was not going to be restricted to a merely ceremonial role and as an ancient institution of accumulated wisdom, it would supervise the coordinates of the political system. The state was no longer going to be led by priests but it would not become in reality fully secular despite pronouncements to the contrary. And more importantly a sort of tacit agreement between the personnel of the state and the personnel of the Church would delay as much as possible the process of secularisation at the level of society as well. This was more or less the story of the 1980s in Cyprus.

The Church-politics nexus in a new era

By the early 1990s however, this sort of arrangement seemed no longer sustainable. There were developments on a series of fields that brought about shifts in the positions and stances of state and church actors responding to the changing context of a society undergoing substantial transformation. The rapid economic growth led by the tourist boom and the increased integration of Cyprus in the global economy enhanced the influence and role of business in general and the Church as a business actor in particular. The liberal breeze brought about by the Vasileiou government in a more generalised attempt to “modernise the state” and the orientation towards the European Community allowed some progressive reforms to happen and be accepted, with family law changes (eg the institutionalisation of civil marriage and divorce) and later on the decriminalisation of homosexuality being the most characteristic of this era. There was also some sort of an attempt by the Church of Cyprus to modernise itself to some extent, increase its tolerance with respect to lax moral behaviours, lifestyles and new habits of the faithful in order to adapt to the new times while maintaining its influence. Nevertheless one should not overestimate the change. The Church's ideological influence remained strong, its conservatism as an institution maintained and its hegemony in educational and morality matters reaffirmed in the course of the decade. The fact that Clerides himself, the liberal president already in his late 70s felt compelled to have his Indian wife baptised so that he could have a Christian Orthodox wedding with her, was deeply symbolic of the continued dominance of the Church amidst and despite the changing climate.

What was more obvious though in the 1990s was the more direct intervention of the Church in the politics of the Cyprus problem. The breaking of the deadlock in the negotiations brought about by Vasileiou's activist Cyprus problem policy which made the possibility of a federal solution a visible prospect in the form of the “Ghali set of Ideas” provoked an alert amongst rejectionists in general and the Church in particular. The archbishop himself encouraged a series of acts aiming to enlighten the people and warn the political leaders that they ought to return to the “correct line” refusing that is negotiations with a view towards achieving a compromise solution and intensifying the campaigning against Turkey. In the presidential elections of 1993 the Archbishop encouraged the alliance between DIKO and EDEK on a rejectionist, quasi anti-federal platform and pressured with significant success Clerides to adopt a harder line on the Cyprus problem in order to get elected.
The 1990s was a time of a more general rekindling of the anti-compromise forces in the guise of the “anti-occupation movement” and these were supported in numerous ways and to a significant extent by the Church and the Archbishop himself personally. Associations of the faithful, youth religious networks and conservative community groups were re-organised and given more attention, displaced persons clubs were revived with the slogan of “Return” denoting literally “a return to their villages” in the north but also and more importantly connoting “the return to the pre 1974 condition”. The Pancyprian Refugee Party was formed which focused its energy in combating all rapprochement activities between the Greek Cypriots (referred to as the victims) and the perpetrator forces of Attila (which also included all the Turkish Cypriots residing in the north). The leader of this Party, who was also the archbishop's nephew, gathered some of the women who had lost their loved ones in the war of 1974 and set up a permanent protest stand at Ledra Pallace, in order to enlighten the tourists crossing the buffer zone about the crimes of Turkey and prevent them from supporting the illegal and pseudo regime in the north by entering the area under its control. This was the time that the Church also formed its own radio station and then television so that the word of God and his archbishop in Cyprus could reach every house. On a more directly political level and originally seemingly independent from the Church, there was also the creation of the first officially anti federation party, the New Horizons.

The resurgence of the rejectionist forces in the mid 1990s took place in a more generalised nationalist climate that took root with the return of the united Right to executive power. Although more symbolic than substantial and to be sure largely banal, nationalism in the 1990s had concrete impact in the broader climate within which Cyprus politics were played out. Pronouncements such as the need for a “Hellenocentric education” and the appointment of the relevant ministers, the repetitive public glorification of EOKA and the set up of institutional means to implement this, the further expansion of armaments spending and the United Defence Doctrine in the over-arching strategy of the “active volcano” were largely aspects of a spectacle yet with a real negative impact. The motorcyclists “march from Berlin to Kyrenia” which had Church and government backing until the last minute and its tragic end was the most emblematic event in this sense.

Church and politics today

The crucial period of 2003-2004 found the Church of Cyprus headless as the archbishop was old and sick and the bishops were in competition with each other with a view to succession. The different ideological tendencies and orientations expressed by different bishops and their alliances and competitions might be an interesting topic for discussion if those who study it open it up, but for the purposes of this argument, intra Church politics are not directly relevant. The Paphos bishop who was the eldest and acting head at the time was quite clear – and his position was shared or tolerated by all the rest of the high priests with the exception of one. And this stance of the Church, adapting to the new circumstances of the new decade continues more or less until today. This can be summed up as an opposition to any sort of compromise solution that creates a secular, bi-communal state that diminishes directly or indirectly the political influence, ideological hegemony and economic power of the Church as this has been established in the conditions of de facto partition. And most importantly pre-emptive action and campaigning with all means possible in order to avert this from happening. Mass church attendance in times such as Christmas and Easter and full coverage by the media of all the statements made by Church leaders proved useful instruments in the spreading of anti-solution propaganda. One need not focus on the more extreme statements such as those of the ex Bishop of Kyrenia who said that those who were to vote Yes in the referendum were bound to go to hell, but on myriad others who were in line with the nationalist rhetoric often with racist connotations of many politicians of the “hard No camp” in 2004 and after.

The current archbishop, Chrysostomos II has of course many continuities with the previous one – but is at the same time different in style and public behaviour. Although there is probably an element of personal character here, it might also be that his lack of pretenses, his audacity and his cynicism are products of our era. A dear colleague insists that he is really an ally of the forces of secularism, not only because of his secular oriented outlook, worldly discourse and brute business mentality, but also and primarily because he is making the best he can to remove the last remaining veils of religiosity and aura from the institution he is heading. That he is in fact the key agent of the demythologisation of the Church and of the erosion of the traditional respect it carries. This might be an interesting thought, yet again one might respond with equal cynicism back – the social power of the Church lies not so much in the metaphysics of its legitimation but rather simply and plainly in its ability to command and have the others obey.

In this sense the conflict between the Church and Christofias' government was quite illuminating in many ways. The fact that the government had eventually to back down on the issue of taxing the Church and effectively accept the agreement made between the Church and Papadopoulos' government which was blatantly benefiting the Church and was thus initially rejected by Christofias' government, was illustrative not only of the weakness of the government but also and more importantly of the weakness of the state itself vis a vis the Church. The Archbishop actually made a statement that he would not pay even if the government secured a court decision and this passed more or less as a normal or natural thing. Similarly on the issue of educational reform, his statements that if the history books change he would call upon the students to burn the new ones, become important not only in terms of the final outcome – the non changing of the nationalist focus and ethnocentric philosophy of education in general and history teaching in particular, but again because this sort of statements passed in the best case as merely excusable exaggerations and in the worse as rightful and justified worries of a caring spiritual leader.

On the Cyprus problem negotiations, before their final deadlock, Chrysostomos II also moved preemptively openly stating his support for new far right wing groupings which emerged, for the anti-federation forces which became more open and loud in their anti-solution cries and placing paid coloured anti-solution advertisements in every Sunday edition of the newspaper with the biggest circulation for months. The list of the current archbishop's interventions in politics in the last few years is of course long and cannot be exhausted here – I will only mention two more which are quite characteristic:
a) his role in the election of Omerou as the head of parliament and the statement he made while justifying his encouraging of Koulias to switch camps, that he was one of the three founders of DIKO, implying that this gave him some sort of special right and say in DIKO's affairs.
b) the open support he offered to Anastasiades and the reciprocation of the new president who offered him the ministry of education, just like the good old times.

So, what does all this tell us? Explanations along the lines of our “conservative society” and of our “troubled history” are of course important and can account for a lot of things. But I am not sure that they fully make the point. We live in a society in which religious instruction to all the children is compulsory, where although the economic crisis has brought the construction sector to its knees, the building of churches continues, where even atheists bow to the paramount social pressure and have religious weddings and baptise their children. We live in a society in which the ethnic conflict of the past not only shapes the present but blocks the future, where nationalist myth constitutes official history, where on television during Easter the first news item is that “Today Jesus Christ was resurrected”. One might respond that these are simply the effects and not the causes of the huge social and ideological hegemony of the Church. And that its causes need to be sought in its political and economic power. True, but the effects of the Church's political and economic power today are also the causes of its hegemony tomorrow.

1Michael, M. (2005) The Church of Cyprus during the Ottoman period, Cyprus Research Centre
2Panayiotou, A (2006) Models of compromise and power sharing in the experience of Cypriot modernity, The Cyprus Review 18:2
3Erdal, M. (2011) The making of sovereignty through changing property/land rights and the contestation of authority in Cyprus, unpublished PhD dissertation, Oxford